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CA Transparency in Supply Chains Act: Can It Stop Worker Abuses Among Suppliers 
in the Developing World? 
Introduction 
Every product has a story that extends far beyond the moment it is purchased off a 
shelf.1 After all, someone has to pick up cotton, turn it into textile, and saw it into a piece of 
clothing before it can be bought in a store. Unbeknownst to most western consumers, there is 
a high chance that the cotton picker is a child, sometimes as young as 12,2 working 40 or 
more hours a week for less than minimum wage or no wage at all. It is also likely that the 
children are forced to toil in poor working conditions, living in dirty barracks and surviving 
off of infrequent and nutritiously deficient meals.3 Factory workers manufacturing garments 
can, likewise, be children or adults. They are pressured, either by force or as a result of 
economic deprivation, to work long hours that violate international labor norms, experience 
physical and verbal abuse in the workplace that, due to poor enforcement of safety standards, 
might turn into a death trap.4    
  Inhumane treatment of workers in suppliers’ factories, farms, mines, and other 
workplaces has received significant amount of public exposure in the last decade. As a result, 
multiple actors, from consumers and nonprofits to transnational corporations, have been 
                                                        
1
 www.Free2Work.org 
2
 “Schoolchildren in cotton fields in Kashkadarya,” Uznews.net, last modified October 25, 
2012, http://www.uznews.net/news_single.php?lng=en&sub=&cid=30&nid=21109. 
3 “‘We Live Subject to their Orders’: A Three‐Province Survey of Forced Child Labor in 
Uzbekistan’s 2008 Cotton Harvest.” International Labor Rights Forum, (2009): 20-23. 
http://www.laborrights.org/sites/default/files/publications-and-
resources/UzbekCottonFall08Report.pdf 
4
 “Inspectors Certified Pakistani Factory as Safe Before Disaster,” Declan Walsh and Steven 
Greenhouse, The New York Times, last modified September 19, 2012,  
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/09/20/world/asia/pakistan-factory-passed-inspection-before-
fire.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0 
 
    
2 
compelled to take a stand against abusive labor practices in supply chains. However, despite 
most passionate efforts, ensuring supplier compliance with international labor standards is a 
challenging task. Factory managers have to contend with costs of running a factory and 
fulfilling demanding production orders buyer corporations. Frequently, violation of labor 
rights allows factory managers to meet their production quotas and make a desirable profit, 
even though doing so means going against labor standards outlined in the supplier codes of 
conduct. Regulation of supply chains becomes more challenging moving upstream. 
Extraction of raw materials is permeated with labor and human rights abuses. Yet, 
manufacturers and, by extension, their buyer corporations have no knowledge of where and 
under what conditions raw materials such as cotton, cocoa, or tin have originated.  
The newest effort to combat worker abuses in supply chains came to fruition in 
California with the passage of California Transparency in Supply Chains Act of 2010 (SB 
657). The purpose of the Act is to put an end to forced labor among suppliers in the U.S. and 
internationally by empowering consumers with knowledge of potential worker abuse. The 
law intends to educate consumers on corporate social responsibility through mandatory SB 
657 disclosures in which companies must reveal what measures they have taken to eradicate 
forced labor from their supply chains. The law was passed after a group called Chain Store 
Reaction sent questionnaires to companies to see what they were doing to end forced labor in 
their supply chains. Chain Store Reaction reported that over 90 percent of contacted 
companies never replied back, which energized the efforts to enact SB 657.5 Since the act 
                                                        
5
 Anthony Pacheco and Sara J. Brenner, "United States: California's Transparency in Supply 
Chains Act : What it Provides, Why it Matters , and what Effects it Will have on Business." 
Mondaq Business Briefing, August 22, 2012.  
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officially went into effect in January of 2011, the word is still out on SB 657’s success in 
holding corporations accountable for forced labor.  
Therefore, the central question of this paper asks how effective SB 657 truly is, and 
what are the factors that might prevent the law from reaching its maximum impact? 
Ironically, the Act’s most glaring oversight might be its sole focus on forced labor. In fact, 
worker rights abuses extend far beyond forced labor and include violations such as 
harassment and discrimination, unsafe work environment, excessive overtime, and retaliation 
against worker unions. Therefore, by drawing legislative and public awareness to forced 
labor, SB 657 risks neglecting other, more prevalent, forms of worker abuse.  In order to 
further delve into this problem, I will be using information gathered by Free2Work, a non-
profit consumer education organization focusing on labor rights abuses in supply chains, to 
study how SB 657 requirements compare to Free2Work’s rigorous company evaluation 
criteria. 
I will also use Michal Foucault’s theory on power and discourse to explain how SB 
657 affects power relations between companies, consumers, suppliers, and workers. Foucault 
believed that power is unequally distributed among different societal actors, benefiting some 
and disadvantaging other. Furthermore, Foucault theorized that power is exercised through 
discourse, whereby dominant groups produce specific type of knowledge about the world 
which is taken as truth. Foucault’s theory is an important contribution to understanding how 
our society operates and why some people are subjected to unequal treatment and prejudice. 
Foucault’s theory on power imbalance can also be applied to examine inequality in the global 
workforce. 
The people who suffer in inhumane working conditions worldwide have been 
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historically marginalized by the society. They are frequently women, children, immigrants, 
racial and ethnic minorities, stateless persons, and other disenfranchised groups. Workers’ 
position of vulnerability is further exacerbated by their status as members of the developing 
world. Alongside experiencing discrimination from within their own communities, the 
workers have to operate in the system of global economic inequality that puts them in the 
position of severe disadvantage when performing work that ultimately will benefit western 
companies. SB 657 has potential to start correcting some of the injustices faced by the 
workers. As the law implemented by the state government and affecting transnational 
corporations operating worldwide, SB 657 carries significant amount of power to shape the 
discourse around forced labor, worker rights and corporate social responsibility. However, 
while the purpose of the Act is to empower consumers and to protect workers, the law’s 
vagueness with regards to corporate disclosure requirements might create a different 
outcome. I will combine Foucault’s theory on power and discourse with the data gathered 
from 32 apparel and electronics companies to show that SB 657 does not alter the current 
power dynamic unfavorable to the workers. Contrary to its intentions, the Act gives 
companies enough leeway to create a version of CSR discourse advantageous to them, thus 
making corporations the SB 657’s ultimate beneficiaries.    
The first part of this paper looks at the background of the issue. Here, I will provide 
information on SB 657, including the law’s requirements, its strengths and its weaknesses. In 
addition to information on SB 657, I will give definitions and statistics on forced labor. 
Furthermore, this part will contain a section on theoretical framework, which will go into 
more detail on how Foucault’s theory applies to SB 657 and labor rights violations. The 
second part of this paper contains literature review that examines scholarly articles pertaining 
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to corporate social responsibility, corporate-consumer and corporate-supplier relations, and 
how these relations affect workers. Lastly, I will present research gathered from companies’ 
SB 657 disclosures and through Free2Work’s CSR evaluation tool. The research will show 
that SB 657 disclosure requirements are insufficient because they are too vague and do not 
address systemic issues, which leads to inadequate worker rights implementation in supply 
chains. 
Background 
Forced Labor and How It Relates to Human Trafficking 
SB 657 specifically targets slavery and human trafficking, which in the context of the 
law refers to forced labor. Therefore, before further discussing merits and weaknesses of the 
Act, it is important to first describe what human trafficking is. According to the U.S. 
Department of State Office to Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons, “the United States 
government considers trafficking in persons to include all of the criminal conduct involved in 
forced labor and sex trafficking, essentially the conduct involved in reducing or holding 
someone in compelled service.”6 International and U.S law has similar definitions of 
trafficking. The Palermo Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, 
especially Women and Children (Trafficking Protocol) states that human trafficking is:  
recruitment, transportation, transfer, harbouring or receipt of persons, by 
means of the threat or use of force or other forms of coercion, of abduction, of 
fraud, of deception, of the abuse of power or of a position of vulnerability or 
of the giving or receiving of payments or benefits to achieve the consent of a 
person having control over another person, for the purpose of exploitation. 
 
Likewise, United States’ Trafficking Victims Protection Act (TVPA) defines human 
trafficking for the purposes other than commercial sexual exploitation as “the recruitment, 
                                                        
6
 “What is Modern Slavery?” Office to Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons, accessed 
November 27, 2012, http://www.state.gov/j/tip/what/index.htm 
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harboring, transportation, provision, or obtaining of a person for labor or services, through 
the use of force, fraud, or coercion for the purpose of subjection to involuntary servitude, 
peonage, debt bondage, or slavery.” Additionally, coercion is defined as “(A) threats of 
serious harm to or physical restraint against any person; (B) any scheme, plan, or pattern 
intended to cause a person to believe that failure to perform an act would result in serious 
harm to or physical restraint against any person; or (C) the abuse or threatened abuse of the 
legal process.” The common thread uniting these two definitions is that human trafficking is 
involuntary, and the labor is extracted from the victim without his or her consent.  This 
means that in order to be considered a victim of human trafficking and forced labor a person 
must be compelled to perform labor either through threat and/or use of violence or, more 
indirectly, through fraud or deception. The later part frequently involves threatening victim 
with legal action, especially if a victim is an illegal immigrant, or trapping a trafficked person 
into debt bondage, which can be best described as a practice where employer gives worker a 
high-interest loan, but compensates him or her with extremely low wages, making the debt 
unpayable. Also important to note is that a person does not have to be transported to be 
considered a victim of trafficking.7 
  Some forms of child labor fall under the definition of human trafficking. ILO’s Worst 
Forms of Child Labour Convention, 1999 (No. 182) includes “all forms of slavery or 
practices similar to slavery, such as the sale and trafficking of children, debt bondage and 
serfdom and forced or compulsory labour” in the definition of worst forms of child labor.8 
                                                        
7 “Human Trafficking FAQs,” Polaris Project, accessed November 27, 2012. 
http://www.polarisproject.org/human-trafficking/human-trafficking-faqs 
8
 International Labour Organization (ILO), Convention 182,  “Worst Forms of Child Labour 
Convention”, June 17, 1999, 
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ILO also defines “work which, by its nature or the circumstances in which it is carried out, is 
likely to harm the health, safety or morals of children” as a worst form of child labor and 
calls for its elimination.9 However, SB 657 does not specify whether “human trafficking” is 
intended to mean all work harmful to children or if it is limited to forced child labor. For the 
purposes of this paper, terms “human trafficking” and “forced labor” mean work performed 
by an individual of any age against his or her will and under physical and/or psychological 
coercion. The term “child labor” will refer to ILO’s definition of worst forms of child labor 
presented above and to work performed by children that is “mentally, physically, socially or 
morally dangerous and harmful to children; and interferes with their schooling by: depriving 
them of the opportunity to attend school; obliging them to leave school prematurely; or 
requiring them to attempt to combine school attendance with excessively long and heavy 
work.”10 
Within supply chains, forced labor is a prevalent phenomenon and can be found in 
multiple stages of production. According to the International Labor Organization (ILO), 
globally 20.9 million people are victims of forced labor. Forced labor is classified into three 
categories: labor imposed by the state, and labor imposed by the private economy for the 
purposes of industrial or sexual exploitation. Out of the three categories, forced labor in the 
private economy claims 90 percent, or 18.7 million, of individuals, where 4.5 million are 
victims of sex trafficking, and 14.2 million are victims of labor trafficking. Women and girls 
make up the majority, 55 percent, of total forced labor victims (98 percent are victims of the 
                                                                                                                                                                            
http://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=1000:12100:0::NO::P12100_INSTRUMENT_ID:31
2327 
9
 ILO Convention 182 
10
 “What is Child Labor,” International Labor Organization, accessed November 27, 2012, 
http://www.ilo.org/ipec/facts/lang--en/index.htm 
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sex industry, and 40 percent are victims of forced industrial and domestic labor). Adults are 
more likely to be subjected to forced labor. The ILO study found that 74 percent of victims 
are 18 or older, whereas, 26 percent of victims are aged 17 or younger. 11 
SB 657  
 To remediate the issue of lax supply chain management, SB 657 attempts to hold 
corporations accountable for labor violations among the suppliers. SB 657 requires that 
“retail sellers and manufacturers doing business in the state to disclose their efforts to 
eradicate slavery and human trafficking from their direct supply chains for tangible goods 
offered for sale” by creating a clearly visible and easy to access SB 657 compliance page on 
their website. If a company does not have a website, it must present a written copy of its 
efforts upon request (a company has 30 days to comply with the request). A company must 
disclose to what extent it: (a) engages in verification of product supply chains to evaluate and 
address risks of human trafficking and slavery; (b) conducts audits of suppliers to evaluate 
supplier compliance with company standards for trafficking and slavery in supply chains; (c) 
requires direct suppliers to certify that materials incorporated into the product comply with 
the laws regarding slavery and human trafficking of the country or countries in which they 
are doing business; (d) maintains internal accountability standards and procedures for 
employees or contractors failing to meet company standards regarding slavery and 
trafficking; and (e) provides company employees and supervisors, who have direct 
                                                        
11
 “ILO Global Estimate of Forced Labour Results and methodology.” International Labor 
Organization, (2012): 13-21. http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---ed_norm/---
declaration/documents/publication/wcms_182004.pdf 
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responsibility for supply chain management, training on human trafficking and slavery, 
particularly with respect to mitigating risks within the supply chains of products.12 
The law is limited in that it only applies to companies making $100 million dollars or 
more in sales worldwide. A company is also subject to the law if a company is: (a) organized 
or commercially domiciled in California; (b) sales of the company in California exceed the 
lesser of $500,000 or 25 percent of total sales; (c) real property and tangible personal 
property of the company in California exceed the lesser of $50,000 or 25 percent of the 
taxpayer’s total real property and tangible property; or (d) the amount paid by the company 
in California for compensation exceeds the lesser of $50,000 or 25 percent of total 
compensation paid.13 Yet, despite the restrictions, SB 657’s scope is extensive enough to 
include 3200 of industry’s leading corporations.14 
SB 657 Benefits 
SB 657 is significant for two main reasons. First, it is the only law in the nation to 
“expose and combat human trafficking through consumer awareness.”15 Furthermore, the 
California law might be replicated at the federal level since a bill similar to SB 657 was 
“introduced in the United States House of Representatives in August of 2011.”16 Second, SB 
657 holds companies accountable for their supply chains, and, unlike corporate codes of 
conduct, compliance with SB 657 is mandatory. The law impacts major companies in 
apparel, electronics, food, beverage and other sectors. Making industry leaders to take 
                                                        
12
 California Transparency in Supply Chains Act, CA Senate Bill 657 (passed Sept. 30, 2010) 
13
 SB 657 
14
 “Compliance is Not Enough:Best Practices in Responding to The California  
Transparency in Supply Chains Act.” Verite, (2011): 3. 
http://www.verite.org/sites/default/files/VTE_WhitePaper_California_Bill657FINAL5.pdf 
15 Pacheco and Brenner “United States: California's Transparency In Supply Chains Act.” 
16
 Ibid. 
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command of their supply chains can have a wide-reaching impact. Some of the corporations 
affected by SB 657 have thousands of suppliers employing hundreds of thousands of workers 
throughout the world. Institutional isomorphism17 suggests that diligent implementation of 
the law would create higher corporate social responsibility (CSR) standards, compelling 
competing corporations to raise their level of accountability in order to remain relevant, thus 
scaling SB 657’s reach. However, for all its positives, the law has several drawbacks, which 
will be discussed in the following section.  
SB 657 Weaknesses 
SB 657 is unable to fulfill its full potential due to the following three factors: 1) it 
places the bulk of enforcement responsibility on the consumers; 2) its scope is too narrow; 3) 
it shifts the discourse from addressing different kinds of worker rights violations to focusing 
on only one concern: forced labor. 
SB 657 is a transparency and awareness rising mechanism.18 The law requires that 
companies disclose what, if any measures, they have taken to eliminate human trafficking 
from their supply chains. Stating that a company has only addressed the problem to a limited 
extent would make it complaint with the law.19 According to Verite, “the penalty for non-
compliance with the Act is injunctive relief by the California Attorney General. This means 
companies will not face a monetary penalty for failure to disclose, but that they will receive 
an order from the Attorney General to take specific action.” However, there appears to be 
                                                        
17
 According to Islam and McPhail, “One key aspect of institutional theory is the concept of 
isomorphism. Dillard, Rigsby and Goodman explain that ‘isomorphism refers to the 
adaptation of an institutional practice by an organisation.’ In particular, this concept refers to 
the processes whereby organizations within the same line of business come to adopt similar 
kinds of response to the same set of social and environmental pressures” (pg. 11). 
 
18
 SB 657 
19
 Verite, “Compliance is Not Enough,” 2. 
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little action taken by the state of California to enforce the law.20 So far, the only negative 
consequences a company might suffer from SB 657 is retaliation from the consumers who 
might be unhappy with company’s lack of initiative. Thus, the responsibility of turning SB 
657 into an effective law rests primarily with the consumers. The fairness of this demand is 
debatable. In order for SB 657 to have maximum impact, consumers must research a brand 
prior to making a purchase. While a segment of population will do so, not everyone will have 
the desire and motivation to familiarize themselves with companies’ adherence to SB 657 
and then alter their shopping behavior accordingly. Yet, the power of consumer pressure 
cannot be underestimated. Past shows, that individuals who decide to shop conscientiously 
have influenced corporate practices.21 For example, Nike agreed to release a public list of its 
suppliers and made efforts to improve labor conditions in the supply chain as a result of 
consumer boycotts.22  
However, SB 657’s biggest limitation is the very function it intends to serve. By 
focusing only on human trafficking, SB 657 allows the company to be unresponsive to other 
types of labor abuse such as long working hours, mandated overtime, low wages, and 
discrimination based on personal attributes. Forced labor in supply chains arises from 
systemic conditions that contribute to a broader set of worker rights violations. While forced 
labor is undoubtedly an important concern, a person does not have to be trafficked to be 
subjected to labor abuses.  
                                                        
20
 Pacheco and Brenner “United States: California's Transparency In Supply Chains Act.” 
21
 David J. Doorey, "The Transparent Supply Chain: From Resistance to Implementation at 
Nike and Levi-Strauss." Journal of Business Ethics 103, no. 4 (11/01, 2011): 587-603, 
doi:10.1007/s10551-011-0882-1.  
22
 Ibid, 589.  
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Apple’s recent controversy with Foxconn, an electronics components manufacturer, 
demonstrates how labor issues extend far beyond trafficking. Foxconn is the world’s largest 
maker of electronic components; it also counts Apple Inc., Acer Inc., Dell, Toshiba, Hwelett-
Packard and other electronics giants as its major costumers. Investigations of Foxconn have 
found illegal amounts of overtime, crowded working conditions, and numerous industrial 
accidents that resulted in four deaths and 100 accidents.23 Foxconn’s workers have been 
found to live in unsanitary dormitories, feeling stressed everyday due to the high-pressure 
working environment, and experiencing humiliating punishments by the management for 
taking short breaks. Foxconn has also been accused of using forced labor, adding one more 
worker rights violation to an already sizeable list not covered by SB 657.  
Lastly, SB 657 runs the risk of reshaping the discourse on labor rights violations by 
framing the issue in terms of human trafficking only. By concentrating solely on forced labor 
(which is already treated by companies as a severe zero-tolerance violation and grounds for 
termination of supplier contract), SB 657 misses an opportunity for a more comprehensive 
regulation of supply chains. As was mentioned earlier, in order for human trafficking to 
occur, certain conditions must be in place for suppliers to condone the practice in the 
workplace. Trying to eliminate human trafficking without eliminating the root causes will not 
lead to a long-term solution. Conversely, targeting systemic issues in the supply chain 
management will help to curtail trafficking and other labor abuses. In short, SB 657’s current 
approach to problem will not have the strongest impact.  
                                                        
23
 “China Contractor Again Faces Labor Issue on iPhones,” David Barboza and Charles 
Duhigg, The New York Times, date modified September, 10, 2012, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/09/11/technology/foxconn-said-to-use-forced-student-labor-
to-make-iphones.html?_r=1 
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Theoretical framework 
 The purpose of SB 657 is to provide consumers with insight into the way corporations 
operate and what measures the companies have taken to address human trafficking in supply 
chains. To accomplish this, SB 657 establishes several criteria by which consumers can 
assess how well the companies are complying with the law. By making knowledge on 
aspects of supply chain management public, SB 657 provides consumers with power to 
penalize companies whose social performance is not up to par. The impact of SB 657 also 
does not end with consumers and corporations, but rather, it reaches suppliers, whose 
performance is monitored by companies, and workers whose wellbeing is dependent upon 
SB 657’s successful implementation. As a result, SB 657 produces multiple subjects who can 
be divided into four major groups of consumers, corporations, suppliers and workers. 
Therefore, the process of subject formation is important to understand in order to evaluate 
how much power each of the groups possesses under the law, and how well SB 657 
addresses inequalities that might exist between them. This section will use Michel Foucault’s 
theories on subject formation, power and surveillance to examine how SB 657 shapes the 
categories of consumers, corporations, suppliers and workers and how they relate to each 
other.  
For Foucault the term ‘discourse’ refers to “well-bounded areas of social knowledge,” 
meaning that “in any given historical period we can write, or think about a given social 
object or practice only in certain specific ways and not others. ‘A discourse’ would then be 
whatever constraints-but also enables – writing, speaking and thinking writing such specific 
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historical limits.”24 Furthermore, McHoul and Grace write that “Foucault’s conception of 
discourse is indispensable for an understanding of the role of ‘power’ in the production of 
knowledge.”25 Since SB 657 has legislative power to demand that companies produce a 
specific kind of knowledge about their supply chains, it limits the understanding of workers 
rights abuses to the knowledge companies create. Due to SB 657’s focus on forced labor, 
forced labor will likely come dominate consumer awareness as the worker’s rights issue of 
outmost importance. While victims of forced labor might benefit from increased awareness 
of the problem, the situation of workers unaffected by it is unlikely to change. Additionally, 
whatever knowledge consumers gather from SB 657 disclosures will shape their 
understanding of CSR and supply chain management. Since SB 657 is not very detailed 
about the kind of information companies are required to provide, they will have a significant 
degree of influence over the type of knowledge that will reach consumers. This will give 
companies an opportunity to manipulate consumer perception of the extent to which 
companies engage in CSR. This has serious repercussions for successful SB 657 
implementation, which are explained below.    
Consumers 
Foucault postulates that power is understood in “terms of the techniques through 
which it is exercised.”26 Foucault uses Jeremy Bentham’s plan for the Panopticon to illustrate 
how power operates through surveillance.27 The Panopticon consists of a watchtower in the 
center of a courtyard surrounded by buildings filled with cells. Each cell contains two 
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windows: one to allow for the passage of light and another one facing the surveillance tower, 
providing a complete view of the inmate. Although the inmate is constantly on display, he 
himself has no way of telling if the tower contains a guardian. Therefore, the inmate must act 
as if surveillance is continuous and absolute.28 After a period of adjusting his or her behavior 
to meet required standards, the subject internalizes the said standards and becomes a self-
policing entity. Furthermore, the power of the observer is anonymous and uninterrupted, and 
anyone can assume that role. At the same time, the observers also become subjects of control 
by occupying central position within the Panopticon, where they are “thoroughly enmeshed 
in localization and ordering of their behavior.”29  
Unlike Panopticon, SB 657 does not regulate physical space; such task with regards 
to transnational corporations and their suppliers operating worldwide would be impossible to 
accomplish. However, SB 657 makes transparent aspects of corporate processes that might 
have been previously concealed from consumer base, thus fulfilling Panopticon’s function of 
surveillance by putting consumers in the position of observer and making companies the 
object of consumer discipline. Since companies are made to reveal information about 
themselves for public scrutiny, the information has to be honest and genuine. Once the 
information is given to the public use, it can be verified for accuracy, and being caught in a 
lie can be more damaging for corporate image than failing to provide a necessary disclosure. 
Like Panopticon, SB 657 can lead companies to internalize the law’s criteria and make more 
of an effort to provide honest information that fulfills all of the requirements. These CSR 
practices would be motivated by companies’ knowledge that at any time they are being 
evaluated by consumers, whose purchasing decisions determine business’s success.  
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Additionally, SB 657 engineers a more user-friendly mechanism of assessing 
corporate social responsibility performance. While variety of watchdog groups exist to 
document and report corporate malpractices, such reports are scattered and presented in 
different formats lacking uniformity. With implementation of SB 657, consumers seeking 
information on companies’ progress in eliminating labor trafficking from supply chains will 
have a specific place (company’s website) to access the information covering five 
requirements set out by SB 657.  Such streamlining of the disclosure process turns it into an 
easy-to-enforce disciplinary technology wielded by anonymous consumer mass. However, as 
consumers are fulfilling their observer role, their behavior is also controlled by SB 657’s 
limitations. In other words, consumers’ actions will be informed by the knowledge made 
transparent through SB 657, which might not accurately reflect reality of corporate 
engagement with social responsibility.  
Corporations 
If enforcement of labor rights depended solely on consumer demand for and 
implementation of corporate social responsibility, fair workplace would have become a 
universal standard in the 90s, when the public first began to speak out against sweatshop 
working conditions in the developing world. Foucault’s theories help to explain why that did 
not happen. Foucault views power as a “cluster of relations,” which is “multidirectional, 
operating from the top down and also from the bottom up.” 30 The interplay between 
consumers and corporations is more complex than the straightforward transparency-and-
accountability approach created by SB 657. Companies do not unconditionally comply with 
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expectations placed upon them. Rather, they search for a way to leverage existing regulations 
to their advantage.  
Foucault claims that power relations are “intentional and nonsubjective…they are 
imbued, through and through, with calculation: there is no power that is exercised without a 
series of aims and objectives.”31 Companies pursue their own goals, the primary objective of 
which typically involves profit accumulation. To continue maximizing their returns, 
companies must balance social and business concerns. Nevertheless, business objectives 
usually take priority over meaningful social compliance engagement with suppliers. Lim and 
Phillips describe the situation in the following way: “The traditional market-oriented 
governance model has been inhospitable to [companies’] CSR codes because the suppliers’ 
performance is judged entirely on price, quality, and delivery. These economic pressures 
encourage suppliers to cheat on CSR to avoid costly changes and lost competitiveness.”32 
Lim and Phillips use Nike to demonstrate their point. The company was able to transfer 
“competitive pressures of manufacturing” such as low costs and order delivery to suppliers, 
while generating profits through its core activities which include “innovation, strategic 
marketing, distribution, and design.”33 However, when sweatshop conditions in Nike’s 
factories became public knowledge, Nike turned into one of the first corporations to 
experience the fallout of neglecting supplier CSR concerns in favor of making profit. In order 
to rectify the damage to its image, Nike had to make a difficult choice between disclosing 
addresses of its suppliers and losing its collegiate market (which was a major actor in the 
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anti-sweatshop movement in the 90s). Neither of these options was desirable to Nike’s 
business objective. Even though Nike eventually took extensive measures to correct its 
wrongdoings, its image is still associated with worker abuses of the past. To avoid reliving 
Nike’s experience, companies try to generate their own discourse to manipulate consumer 
perception and create a more favorable impression of themselves. By doing so, corporations 
can secure favorable consumer attitudes and willingness to buy from them.  
SB 657 disclosure requirements are not specific enough, leaving companies to decide 
how much detail about their operations to make public. While SB 657 ensures that 
consumers are provided knowledge, it is incomplete, addressing only parts of anti-human 
trafficking efforts and none of the other labor concerns. Foucault theorized that while 
different power relations are unequal, domination of one side by the other “is not the essence 
of power,” and “power is exercised on the dominant as well as on the dominated; there is a 
process of self-formation or autocolonization involved.”34 Using bourgeoisie as an example, 
Foucault reasoned that in order to become the dominant group, they first had to form 
themselves as a class. Technologies of control (such as regulation of health and mental 
institutions and the confessional) had to first be applied by the bourgeoisie on the 
bourgeoisie, before they could be extended to the working class.35 According to Foucault, 
“one could say that the strategy of moralization (health campaigns, workers’ housing, clinics, 
etc.) of the working class was that of the bourgeoisie. One could even say that it is this 
strategy which defined them as a class and enabled them to exercise their domination.36” 
Companies use CSR to self-regulate, and thus to establish themselves as a class of ethical 
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corporate citizens. SB 657 is another means by which such self-regulation takes place. 
Companies now can use SB 657 to control the parameters of discussion and public awareness 
with regards to human trafficking. SB 657 lacks strong provisions that would demand the 
level of transparency needed to impact meaningful change on corporate practices. While 
consumers are given the power to discipline companies, the discipline is still exercised on 
companies’ terms.  Being in complete compliance with SB 657 will not necessarily make 
company’s mode of operation more ethical. For example, telling consumers that a company 
conducts supplier audits has limited impact, if detailed monitoring results and corrective 
action plans are not publically disclosed. If consumers have little or no knowledge about 
audit results, how are they to know what the specific issues are and how these issues are 
being addressed? Similarly, stating that the audits take place does not speak to the audits’ 
quality. Are workers interviewed off-site? Were interviewed workers pre-selected by 
factory’s management? How well can auditors speak workers’ native language, and are 
auditors trained to properly identify rights abuses they might encounter? SB 657 does not ask 
for disclosure to any of these questions, but these are the questions that make a difference to 
how thoroughly workers’ rights are protected. SB 657 creates a kind of discourse, where 
companies ultimately decide what information to disclose. Companies might be considered 
ethical if they comply with the law. However, corporations play significant role in defining 
the meaning of “ethical”. In this regard, the companies are endowed with considerable 
amount of power that is denied to suppliers and workers.  
Suppliers and Workers 
The discourse created by SB 657 is not limited to companies and consumers 
concerned with ethical business practices. Suppliers, who are often located in the developing 
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world, are directly affected by consumer and corporate demands. Buying companies usually 
have a of set ethical compliance criteria, which is already reflected in SB 657 and might 
become more prominent now that it is a part of the law. These criteria dictate supplier 
behavior, leading suppliers to prioritize some aspects of CSR over others. For example, 
majority of suppliers have been responsive to prohibition on child labor since companies 
have zero-tolerance stance on the issue. Violation of the child labor rules might lead to the 
termination of supplier contract, which is an unacceptable outcome for suppliers who, like 
corporations, are driven by profit accumulation. The power relations between consumers and 
corporations are replicated here between corporations and suppliers with one notable 
exception: suppliers’ status as members of the developing world puts them at a significant 
disadvantage with Western-based companies. So, while holding suppliers to higher social 
compliance standards can ideally lead to improved working conditions, the lack of level 
playing filed between companies and suppliers places majority of compliance costs on the 
latter.37 What often turns out to be the case is that corporations saddle suppliers with high 
ethical standards, but provide them no support to meet these standards. For example, putting 
limits on excessive overtime will not help if the company presents suppliers high production 
quota and insufficient lead time. However, SB 657 does not have any measures that would 
resolve the power imbalance between suppliers and corporations. 
While SB 657 intends to empower consumers with information to make better 
purchasing decisions, the other part of its mission is to improve the lives of individuals who 
have been subjected to labor trafficking. However, SB 657 is incapable of providing workers 
with agency. Even though the rights of forced laborers are SB 657’s ultimate concern, the 
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workers’ empowerment is dependent upon decisions of consumers, corporations, and 
suppliers. Furthermore, the discourse produced by SB 657 fails to call for transparency in 
areas that would provide a clear picture of worker’s conditions and how they are being 
impacted by the law. Merely finding forced labor in the supply chain is not enough. SB 657 
needs to be more aggressive in producing knowledge that shows what happens after a 
corporation intervenes with its suppliers to correct labor violations. The law does not ask if 
companies have a remediation programs for trafficked workers or if workers are 
compensated for their labor. Ironically, despite being the reason for SB 657’s existence, 
worker’s rights are sidelined by SB 657’s focus on corporate-consumer relations. Not one of 
the law’s requirements asks for more in-depth transparency that would provide a 
comprehensive look at workplace conditions. More importantly, SB 657 excludes many 
prevalent worker rights violations from the discourse by focusing on human trafficking only.  
According to Foucault’s theory, SB 657 is a discursive practice that “establishes 
relations between the other types of relations.”38 While consumers, corporations, suppliers 
and workers existed within a network of power relations prior to SB 657, the new law 
reshapes how the four entities interact with each other in the context of human trafficking. 
When SB 657 reframes discourse on labor issues to focus on forced labor, it prioritizes these 
violations in consumer and corporate consciousness by giving them legal support. 
Regrettably, SB 657 unintentionally shifts the power away from the workers who are not 
trafficking victims by blocking their access to one mechanism that has legal and state power 
to influence corporate and supplier actions. SB 657 also leaves companies to decide the 
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extent of their transparency, which prevents consumers from receiving and accurate portrayal 
of corporate activities.  
Literature Review 
Since SB 657 only recently went into effect, no information exists which thoroughly 
analysis the law and its possible impacts. This literature review focuses on the works that 
examine relations between consumers, corporations, suppliers and workers. By researching 
these works, I was hoping to look more closely at consumer and corporate attitudes to ethical 
business practices and to draw attention to the systemic causes of human trafficking and 
other labor abuses. The goal of this review is to use current literature to determine how SB 
657 might fit in with already existing connections between consumers, companies, suppliers 
and workers.  
Consumer and Corporate Relations 
The study of literature shows that consumer-corporate relations are more complicated 
than a straightforward exchange of money in return for goods and services. Consumers and 
corporations influence each other’s behavior.  By making a purchase or by deciding to 
boycott a product, consumers signal to companies what type of corporate conduct is 
appropriate in a society at large. Corporate social responsibility standards were developed as 
a way to satisfy consumer demand for more ethical social and environmental practices. Since 
consumers have the power to influence companies, businesses and sociologists alike have 
invested significant amount of resources to understand how strong consumer concern with 
CSR is, and what motivates consumer ethical purchasing behavior. Because implementation 
of SB 657 and disciplinary action against companies depends on consumer behavior, below 
section examines how consumers and companies relate to each other and what guides their 
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decision making process.   
Consumer Power 
Different surveys have been carried out to determine the percentage of consumers 
willing to buy ethically made products. While around 80 percent of respondents report their 
support for purchasing sweat-free products, a significantly smaller percentage actually 
follows through on the idea. The discrepancy between verbal support for ethical purchasing 
and action is in part attributed to higher prices that are incurred by ethically manufactured 
goods.39 Prasad and her colleagues have conducted an experiment to test how much more 
consumers are willing to pay for ethically made products. A well-known department store in 
a Michigan working class neighborhood was selected as experiment’s venue. There, the 
researchers placed two racks of identical socks. However, one rack was labeled as containing 
products produced under ethical working conditions. The other rack did not have a label, 
letting consumers to believe that the socks were not made under ethical working conditions.40 
Over the period of five months, the researchers incrementally increased the price on labeled 
socks from 0 to 40 percent. The findings revealed that when labeled and non-labeled socks 
were sold for the same price, half the customers chose labeled product, while the other half 
didn’t. When the price on labeled socks was raised, the purchases fell to 30 percent, and once 
the price reached 30 percent increase, only 11 percent of customers would still buy the 
labeled product.41   
The authors conclude “that most consumers preferred the cheaper unlabeled socks, 
                                                        
39
 Monica Prasad, Howard Kimeldorf, Rachel Meyer, and Ian Robinson, "Consumers of the 
World Unite: A Market-Based Response to Sweatshops." Labor Studies Journal 29, no. 3 
(Fall, 2004): 63, doi:10.1353/lab.2004.0043  
40
 Prasad, “Consumers of the World Unite,” 66. 
41
 Ibid, 69. 
    
24
suggesting that price considerations dominated the purchasing decision made by about three-
fourths of all consumers.”42 Prasad and her colleagues admit that the study was not 
necessarily an accurate simulation of consumer reality.  Because the experiment used 
identical products, it eliminated the question of consumer preference for unlabeled products 
due to characteristics other than price. Not accounting for personal preference is a significant 
experimental limitation. As other studies will show, consumer behavior can be fickle and a 
desire for a specific product can override concerns for ethical production. However, Prasad’s 
study does accurately show a segment of consumers who will buy ethically made goods 
because it is a morally responsible thing to do. The question is whether conscientious 
consumers have enough clout to alter corporate behavior in a significant way.   
While not every consumer who professes his or her support for ethical buying follows 
through on these beliefs, enough people do to warrant concerns among businesses. Consumer 
boycotts have been shown to be an effective tool for enforcement of corporate responsibility. 
Given their usefulness, Jill Klein and her colleagues have conducted a study to determine 
what leads consumers to boycott in the first place. The research provides some insight into 
consumer motivation that was absent in Prasad’s experiment.  One of the major findings 
shows that perceived egregiousness of company’s actions is a strong driving force behind 
decision to boycott. Klein writes that “the more egregious a consumer perceived the firm’s 
behavior, the more likely the consumer was to boycott. However, egregiousness 
notwithstanding, most of the [consumer] sample was not participating in the [case study] 
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boycott.”43 One of the mitigating factors behind consumer choice to abstain from the boycott 
is the cost of the product that would have to be given up. This supports Prasad’s findings of 
decreasing ethical consumption due to the prize increase. Another interesting finding 
indicates that consumers “need to realize intrinsic rewards of boycott participation, 
potentially boosting or maintaining self-esteem by, for example, avoiding guilt and 
responding to social pressure.”44   
Klein concludes that although high levels of perceived egregiousness is not enough to 
solicit high consumer participation in the boycott, small amount of participation is still 
sufficient to inflict damage on the target company. The boycott studied by Klein resulted in 
sales loss in a competitive market for Bremmer (the boycotted company), and gave 
Bremmer’s customers a reason to try products of its competitors. More importantly, the 
brand’s image was damaged among boycotters and non-boycotters, so even after the boycott 
is over, the negative perception of the brand will result in future lost sales.45 Ultimately, 
Prasad’s and Klein’s research proves that the lawmakers trust in consumer ability to enforce 
SB 657 is not misplaced. From theoretical standpoint, the importance of transparency and 
accurate knowledge of companies’ social responsibility practices becomes even more 
important since research shows that consumers respond to CSR infractions by attempting to 
regulate corporate behavior. However, the extent to which consumers can be trusted to police 
companies might have to be reevaluated in lieu of the findings presented below.   
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Consumers’ Motivations 
As noted by the Prasad and Klein, consumer buying habits are more complex than 
choosing a product not made in sweatshop conditions. Companies know this. Engagement 
between consumers and corporations involves smart marketing and public relations 
campaigns conducted by the companies to keep their costumers satisfied. Foucault’s theory 
suggests that companies will do whatever is necessary to achieve their objective, and winning 
consumer approval is part of the profit making strategy. Bhattacharya and Sen write that 
businesses leaders are striving to find “the appropriate goals guiding the formulation and 
deployment of CSR initiatives that will reap the greatest benefits for their companies.”46 
However, consumers do not have identical reactions to corporate CSR efforts. The authors 
state: 
First, there is significant heterogeneity across consumers in their reactions to CSR 
initiatives; what works for one consumer segment does not work for another. Second, 
the impact of CSR initiatives on outcomes “internal” to the consumer (e.g., 
awareness, attitudes, and attributions) is significantly greater and more easily 
assessable than its impact on the “external” or visible outcomes (e.g., purchase 
behavior, word- of-mouth). Third, the focal company is not the only one that benefits 
from engaging in CSR initiatives; both consumers and the social issues the initiatives 
represent benefit as well.47   
 
Consumers studied by Bhattacharya and Sen admitted that companies’ CSR 
initiatives have only a marginal effect on their purchasing decisions. Customers reported that 
they were unwilling to buy from companies with better CSR if the product quality or price 
was not satisfactory.48 This finding is consistent with Prasad’s research that fewer customers 
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will pay extra for an ethical product. It is also one of the mitigating factors found by Klein. 
Fewer consumers will boycott if the alternative product costs more.  
Bhattacharya and Sen also found that when consumer is aware company’s CSR 
activities, his or her sense of wellbeing is enhanced.49 Simply knowing that the company is 
doing something to address problematic aspects of business is enough to boost consumers’ 
mood. This finding once again complements Klein’s discovery that consumers experience 
positive sense of self by boycotting products from companies with egregious CSR violations. 
This suggests that consumers’ interaction with companies is guided by their emotions. High 
levels of perceived egregiousness will result in strong emotional response from the 
consumers, prompting them to act if the cost to the self is not too high.  
What emerges is a surface level of engagement between consumers, companies and 
their CSR initiatives that makes everybody feel good, but does not necessarily lead to 
tangible results. This is especially important to SB 657 implementation. Companies can 
inform customers about their CSR efforts and put up SB 657 disclosures without following 
through on them to ensure optimum implementation. Consumers can look at such efforts and 
be happy they exist. Moreover, Bhattacharya and Sen found that “consumers may even 
penalize companies if they perceive that CSR initiatives are typically realized at the expense 
of investments in product and/or service quality. Such adverse reactions are particularly 
likely to hurt sales when these consumers do not feel that the company’s CSR efforts 
somehow improve the product.”50 In other words customer support of CSR is contingent 
upon personal benefits consumers receive for giving said support.  
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Consumers, Corporations and Discourse 
Bhattacharya and Sen found that when companies decide to put their resources behind 
championing the cause, awareness of that cause is likely to rise.51 It follows that as 
companies continue to publish SB 657 disclosures, consumer awareness of human trafficking 
in supply chains should become more widespread. While companies posting SB 657 
disclosures do so to comply with a legal requirement and not necessarily because human 
trafficking is their preferred cause, some use the said disclosures to provide more information 
on human trafficking and to state their moral disapproval of the practice. For instance, 
Patagonia quotes UN Office on Drugs and Crime calling human trafficking a “crime against 
humanity,” followed by two paragraphs explaining what human trafficking is.52 GAP’s 
disclosure states “we believe that no person should be subject to a situation where basic 
needs and fundamental rights are denied.” 53 Other companies including Eileen Fisher, 
Gildan, and HP put information on what human trafficking is and emphasize the importance 
of human rights in their disclosures. By using the language that goes beyond SB 657’s 
requirements, companies undertake a certain level of cause sponsorship and rise consumer 
awareness of human trafficking. Such sponsorship frames forced labor as a workers rights 
issue worthy of immediate concern, while remaining silent on other types of labor abuse. 
Combined with the fact that forced labor is a highly egregious violation, it would not be 
surprising to see consumers react strongly to it and reject companies where forced labor 
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might be present. If SB 657 was a better designed tool, consumers indignation over forced 
labor could be channeled to capably fulfill their disciplinary function, as suggested by 
Foucault’s theory. However, SB 657’s vagueness impedes informed action by the consumers 
and empties consumer power of its impact. 
Although SB 657 is meant to create greater transparency, it can be used to deflect 
consumer attention away from CSR violations. David Doorey’s paper, which discusses how 
Nike and Levi’s came to the decision to publically disclose locations and addresses of their 
suppliers, indirectly touches on this problem. Both, Nike and Levi’s, experienced public 
censure and attacks from NGOs and the media for the way they conducted business. Levi’s 
was criticized for its unwillingness to be transparent about working conditions in its factories, 
while Nike was condemned for its suppliers’ worker abuses. Realizing, that something 
needed to be done to alleviate negative publicity, the companies began considering providing 
full disclosure of their suppliers’ locations. Doorey writes that “although relatively few 
corporations have adopted it to date, factory disclosure has become a new corporate social 
responsibility (CSR) strategy to deflect criticism about supply chain labor practices, a strong 
signal that corporations have ‘nothing to hide.’”54 Doorey supports this point by recounting 
Nike’s Transparency 101 initiative through which Nike began posting some of the factory 
auditing results on its website. When talking about the initiative, Nike’s Director of Global 
Issues at that time said that “we needed a defense against investigations into our factories 
from outside forces. It’s a way to pre-empt nongovernmental organizations and the media 
from playing ‘gotcha.”55 Although they were initially resistant, Nike and Levi’s disclosed 
names and addresses of their suppliers in 2005, after experimenting with limited forms of 
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disclosure and discovering that it did not hurt their self-interest. Doorey’s article shows that 
Nike’s and Levi’s engagement with CSR was a highly calculated process that became a 
solution to social and corporate problems. Realizing that it needed to preempt criticism, Nike 
corrected some of the worst issues in its supplier factories, before it made its operations 
transparent to the public. While Levi’s suppliers did not display any serious labor rights 
violations, Levi’s had to become transparent in order to preserve its good public standing. 
However, in both cases, CSR was used to serve corporate objective of pacifying consumer 
and NGO ire directed at the two companies. Companies can now use SB 657 to show that 
they have “nothing to hide,” by providing vague disclosures on supply chain monitoring and 
verification. Additionally, SB 657 requires significantly less transparency than was 
demanded form Nike and Levi’s, making it a preferable alternative to an exacting consumer 
boycott. From the theoretical perspective, implementing SB 657 disclosures is one of the 
steps that companies can take to construct themselves into a class of ethical businesses, 
where companies have the power to determine what constitutes such business. 
Another tactic through which companies can preserve their dominance is described 
by Smith, Palazzo, and Bhattacharya, who suggest that in order to set their products apart 
from competitors, companies are “loading values in their brand messages.”56 Nike and Levi’s 
can distinguish themselves from the competition by stating that they are part of a handful of 
companies to publically disclose their suppliers’ names and addresses, thus providing for 
greater transparency which promotes better working conditions. In addition to setting 
themselves apart form competitors, companies can continue presenting themselves as good 
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corporate citizens and gathering consumer support by infusing values into their branding. 
Smith writes that “if stronger relationships between corporations and their customers are 
promoted by aligned values, the social and environmental values of the CSR discourse offer 
an ideal opportunity for innovative forms of brand management.”57 SB 657 disclosure can be 
another opportunity for companies to engage in “brand management,” akin to how Nike and 
Levi’s tried to influence public perception by releasing the list of their suppliers.  
In a different study exploring connections between personal identity and brand 
identification, Bhattacharya concludes that “people's need for self-continuity goes hand in 
hand with their need for self-enhancement, or the maintenance and affirmation of positive 
self-views,” and further, “a key way consumers seek to satisfy their self-enhancement need is 
by identifying with organizations that have prestigious identities. Prestige here refers to 
organizational stakeholders' perceptions that other people, whose opinions they value, 
believe that the organization is well regarded.”58 In other words, by identifying with 
companies that have positive reputation among certain people, consumers can augment their 
sense of self-worth. Moreover, Bhattacharya suggests that a brand can become an extension 
of consumer’s identity. According to him, the link of perceived identity similarity between 
consumers and a company “is likely to occur not only because consumers find the self-
relevant information inherent to company identities that are similar to their own easier to 
focus on, process, and retrieve but also because such identities enable them to maintain and 
express more fully and authentically their sense of who they are. For example, a consumer 
                                                        
57
 Smith, et al., “Marketing’s Consequences,” 623. 
58
 C. B. Bhattacharya and Sankar Sen, "Consumer--Company Identification: A Framework 
for Understanding Consumers' Relationships with Companies." Journal of Marketing 67, no. 
2 (04, 2003):80, doi:10.1509/jmkg.67.2.76.18609  
 
    
32
who cares about animal rights will be more attracted to a company that has distinguished 
itself in this regard.”59 By demonstrating their anti-trafficking stance, companies can play on 
consumers’ desire to express their identity by associating with a “prestigious” company. 
Most everyone will agree that ending forced labor is a cause worthy of support; however, not 
every corporation will have an SB 657 disclosure outlining what it is doing to eradicate 
trafficking from the workplace. Companies that do might be at advantage in attracting 
consumers who care about human rights and human trafficking.  
There is a flip side to engaging with consumer’s values since consumers might react 
strongly if the company’s infraction is considered to be sufficiently unethical. However, the 
benefit of SB 657 is that it only requires companies to show effort to improve working 
conditions in their supply chains, without asking to show specific results. SB 657 allows 
companies to tell consumers that they are trying to be better, which might be enough to 
placate majority of customers, seeing how they reward companies for engaging with 
corporate socially responsibility by being willing to overlook and forgive CSR breaches.60 
This enables companies to react to the “growing relevance of social and environmental 
concerns in society by impression management, not by changing their overall marketing and 
procurement policies.”61 In light of corporate manipulation of consumer perception, Smith 
points to the necessity of consumers’ understanding the social impact resulting form their 
purchasing choices. At the same time, Smith cautions against viewing consumers as rational 
actors; a point that is supported by the amount of emotional appeal and manipulation 
conducted by the companies, and consumers’ strong response to emotional issues such as 
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forced and child labor. To support his argument, Smith cites the work of Caruana and Crane 
which discusses how the category or conscientious consumer is constructed though corporate 
discourse.  
Caruana and Crane argue that consumer responsibility, as communicated by 
corporations, is presented as a morally unconflicting concept that is helpful in simplifying 
consumer purchasing choices. The idea behind providing customers with morally 
unconflicting choices is to create a conscientious consumer who would shop based on 
companies’ commitment to social and environmental issues. As it turns out, “there is not a 
pre-existing market of responsible consumers out there waiting to be served, but rather it 
‘must be brought into existence through the assumptions and technologies of market 
segmentation.’”62   
SB 657 adds to the definition of conscientious consumer as someone who is attentive 
to companies’ efforts to eliminate forced labor from their supply chains. The problematic 
aspect of creating an easily identified conscientious consumer is the subsequent bifurcation 
of purchasing decisions into ethical and unethical and the definitions that are attached to each 
category. The process creates a “very specific ethical gaze that simultaneously makes visible 
certain aspects of responsibility while drawing a ‘moral curtain’ around others.”63 Caruana 
and Crane draw on Foucault’s theory to make their case. If corporations first establish 
themselves as an ethical class, Caruana and Crane explain how companies further manipulate 
discourse to extend their reach by creating a class of ethical consumers. In case of SB 657, 
the “moral curtain” is drawn around these aspects of labor abuse that do not include forced 
                                                        
62
 Robert Caruana and Andrew Crane, "Constructing Consumer Responsibility: Exploring the 
Role of Corporate Communications." Organization Studies 29, no. 12 (12, 2008): 1499, 
doi:10.1177/0170840607096387.  
63
 Caruana and Crane, “Constructing Consumer Responsibility,” 1512. 
    
34
labor. This suits corporate interests since consumer attention is focused on an issue of 
trafficking, which the companies can manage through SB 657 with little cost to themselves. 
Under theses circumstances, problems such as unlivable wages and excessive overtime might 
be excluded from consumer awareness, despite their damaging effects on workers’ quality of 
life. SB 657 embeds the concern for human trafficking victims into consumer consciousness 
and values, but skips doing the same for other, just as important, labor issues. It is possible 
that consumer is already aware of labor violations unrelated to human trafficking and takes 
companies’ track on these violations into consideration when making a purchasing decision. 
It is also equally possible that he or she does not ask these types of questions. However, if the 
goal of the legislative measure is to protect workers’ human rights, consumer knowledge of 
labor violations should not be left to chance and limited to only one issue. Consumers have 
ability to influence corporations, which has a tangible impact on the lives of real people. For 
that reason, it is important to ensure that consumers’ purchasing choices are as informed as 
possible.  
According to Caruana and Crane: 
 The construction of the responsible consumer shifts the locus of choice – from 
whether to consume [a product] to which type of [product] to consume, and 
ultimately to which type of responsible consumer product to choose. By shifting from 
the former to the latter, the text assures us that most, if not all, of the relevant social, 
ethical and environmental issues have been attended to. The moral evaluation has 
already taken place, discreetly, behind the scenes. Our task is simply to choose 
between ‘responsible’ alternatives, not to assess whether one option is more 
responsible than another.64 
 
Since SB 657 applies to around 3200 businesses, there will be no shortage of ethical 
alternatives, if the consumer is using efforts to eliminate forced labor from supply chains as 
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the only metric for purchasing decisions. Problematically, a more nuanced evaluation of a 
product might be absent from the process. If a consumer was to take time to learn more 
details about companies’ supply chain management systems, he or she would have to 
consider a more complex set of criteria than the anti-trafficking stance to evaluate CSR. 
However, such learning process is time consuming and might require specialized knowledge. 
To comprehensively evaluate a company, consumer will need to read through thick CSR 
reports and be able to spot areas where a company omits or manipulates information to its 
advantage.  Companies with good SB 657 disclosures might have poor policies on 
subcontracting, lead times, collective bargaining and other worker protection mechanisms.  
Therefore, relying only SB 657 for insight into companies’ operations will not produce a 
well-informed consumer.  
Non-Trafficked Labor 
This section focuses on detailing worker rights violations, unrelated to human 
trafficking, which have been made public during the 90s. As a result, the literature examined 
here highlights the broad scope of labor rights abuses that, despite their severity, don’t 
qualify as human trafficking because the workers in question are not forced or coerced into 
servitude. Additionally, this section looks the literature that discusses measures taken by the 
companies to address supplier compliance problems and how the nature of corporate 
response is dependent on the amount of public inquiry given to an issue. Lastly the section 
presents a discussion on overall effectiveness of corporate codes of conduct. 
Public Scrutiny and Corporate Response to Supplier Noncompliance 
A research by Muhammad Islam and Ken McPhail shows that the companies will 
primarily engage with ethical issues that have high exposure in the media and among 
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consumers. Islam and McPhail studied 18 multinational apparel companies, examining their 
codes of conduct and annual CSR reports for the adoption of ILO’s workplace human rights 
standards. The study’s goal was to investigate how companies construct their range of 
responsibility and how ILO principles influence these constructs.  
According to the research findings, in 2007 selected companies’ codes of conduct 
addressed majority of the following ILO standards: right to the freedom of association, 
elimination of child labor, elimination of forced labor, elimination of all forms of 
discrimination, and demand for a safe and healthy work environment. One code did not 
contain information of freedom of association, and another code did not mention elimination 
of all forms of discrimination.65 The authors found a connection between issues that received 
extra attention from the corporations and issues that were being targeted by media and NGOs 
as instances of human rights abuses in the supply chains. For example, Islam and McPhail’s 
research demonstrates that the issue of child labor received the greatest amount of corporate 
attention between 1990s and 2007. The issue of child labor also frequently appeared in the 
media starting in the 90s and continuing to today. Conversely, freedom of association is a 
“comparatively new issue” enjoying less awareness among media and consumers. The 
overall findings are summarized as such: 
In 2007, 72 percent of major clothing companies disclosed that they adopted 
standards including elimination of child labour, elimination of forced labour, 
elimination of all forms of discriminations, and providing a safe and healthy work 
environment, compared with 20 percent or below in 1997. Disclosure on freedom of 
association remained the lowest of all types but increased over the period (50% in 
2007 compared with 13% in 1997).66   
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Similarly, the study of corporate stand alone reports showed an acute increase in 
companies disclosing on adoption of labor codes such as the right to freedom of association, 
elimination of child and forced labor, elimination of all forms of discrimination, and 
requirement for safe and healthy working conditions. Islam and McPhail’s study parallels 
Caruana and Crane’s theory on creation of responsible consumer. Event though, in the case 
presented by Islam, corporations are the subjects being influenced by NGO, media, and 
consumer discourse of what it means to be a responsible company. There is a seeming 
contradiction in determining whether consumers or companies shape the CSR discourse. 
However, as Foucault’s theory have stated, power does not lie with one entity, but rather with 
multiple actors who possess it and exercise it in different degrees. The literature reviewed so 
far suggest that both, consumers and companies, play a part in determining which labor issue 
to concentrate on in corporate policies. Companies construct a category of conscientious 
consumer based on the issues that consumers respond to the most either through boycotting 
or simply by voicing their disapproval. By doing so, companies align themselves with 
consumer values, creating a bond based on shared beliefs.67   
A study by Stephanie Barrientos focuses on the issue of labor brokers and contract 
workers, which, unlike the noncompliance issues studied by Islam and McPhail, are not 
highly publicized labor concerns. Labor brokers and contract workers operate in a vastly 
unregulated environment, where contract workers have minimum legal protection, are subject 
to inhumane treatment, and are at a high risk of human trafficking. However, the use of labor 
brokers and contract workers has not been sufficiently addressed in supplier codes of conduct 
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or SB 657, which only requires that a company “maintains internal accountability standards 
… for employees or contractors failing to meet company standards regarding slavery and 
trafficking.” Thus, the issue of contract workers is limited to human trafficking framework.  
Barrientos states that demand for contract workers arises out of power imbalance 
between buyers (corporations) and the fragmented supplier base.  As a result of the power 
imbalance, the buyers are able to apply pressure on suppliers to “reduce costs, reduce lead 
times and increase “just in time’ efficiency within the chain.”68 The buyers also expect 
suppliers to comply with the demanding requirements of socially responsible production, 
which allows companies to gain higher profit from the finished product and present it to 
consumers as being made under ethical working conditions. Barrientos describes the 
resulting situation as a Catch 22 for suppliers “where they have to deliver on quality (and 
associated value) which is passed up the value chain, whilst cost and risk is being passed 
down the chain” onto the shoulders of contract workers.69  
Labor brokers play a key part in providing suppliers with contract labor. They recruit 
vulnerable workers, frequently immigrants and women, in sufficient numbers to meet high 
production demands while reducing costs of employment for suppliers.70 While there has 
been some opposition on behalf of the consumers and NGOs to the use of labor brokers, the 
issue is not widely addressed by the companies.71 Such negligence puts into question 
companies’ commitment to their CSR principles beyond appeasing the consumers. The field 
of contract labor is ripe with human rights abuses. Yet, “in the face of strong commercial 
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pressures driving the use of casual and contract labour” companies opt to forego stronger 
regulation of contract workers in favor of carrying on with business.72 As a result, the 
societal power imbalances described by Foucault present themselves in the company-supplier 
relations outlined by Barrientos. Since suppliers are directly responsible for creating ethical 
workplace, they must be given an opportunity to do so. Yet, they are immobilized by the 
competitiveness of the global market place and companies’ demands for better CSR. SB 657 
does not address unequal power distribution between suppliers and companies, thus 
undercutting its own effectiveness. After all, a change in the workplace cannot occur until 
people in the position to effect it are empowered to act.  
 
Labor Rights Violations Case Studies 
Robert Ross presents cases of labor rights violations that do not constitute human 
trafficking and fall outside of SB 657’s scope. Ross looks at two factories with serious labor 
abuses in Mexico and Dominican Republic. The workers in these factories cooperated with 
U.S.- based unions, NGOs and consumer advocacy groups to temporarily change their 
working conditions for the better.  
The first case is Mexico’s Kukdong/Mexmode factory, which produced apparel for 
Nike and Reebok. According to Ross, “abusive supervisors, infested cafeteria food, illegal 
withholding of bonuses, and mandatory overtime” were common types of worker 
maltreatment found at Kukdong.73 The factory’s official worker union, CROC, was deeply 
corrupt and functioned as a company protection union that decidedly did not represent 
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worker interests.  At first, the workers tried to form an independent union and win collective 
bargaining rights. However, these efforts were sabotaged when the members of independent 
union were fired and then beaten by CROC agents. Tired of the situation, Kukdong’s workers 
went on strike demanding better cafeteria food, replacement of CROC, and reinstatement of 
fired supervisors. The protestors, 85 percent of whom were women, were violently disbanded 
by the police, creating a moral outrage in the U.S. that led to activist mobilization.74 
Kukdong’s case fits well with the theories of other authors examined in this literature review. 
Although the right to collective bargaining and the right to independent unions is not a 
leading CSR issue, the plight of Kukdong’s workers was able to gain public attention due to 
violence used to break the workers’ strike. The presence of violence pushed Nike and 
Reebok into the category of companies behaving egregiously; as a result, these companies 
had to suffer through a consumer lashback.  
The second case examined by Ross is BJ&B factory in Dominican Republic 
responsible for manufacturing baseball caps. Investigations of BJ&B found that Korean 
managers sexually and physically abused workers, and subjected them to “graphic racial” 
and sexual slurs. Workers were also underpaid, making less than Dominican government’s 
standards for providing adequate basic necessities for an average family. Additionally,  “most 
BJ&.B workers lived in small self-made houses of corrugated iron or wood. Many lacked 
indoor plumbing; all were crowded.”75 There were reports of firing workers who were 
injured on the job.76 In April 1998, two of BJ&J workers were brought to the U.S. to share 
their stories. The tour received significant media attention, with articles appearing in the New 
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York Times, Boston Globe, Boston Herald, Irish Times, and student newspapers.77   
This case presents a highly publicized instance of sexual and racial discrimination, 
hazardous working conditions, and unlivable wages. Concurrent with Islam and McPhail’s 
study, the CSR focus on the issues of discrimination and unsafe working environment was on 
the rise in the 90s. On the other hand, Islam and McPhail found little to no change on the 
issues of collective bargaining, freedom of association, and living wages, nor were these 
issues a part of corporate conscientious consumer discourse. The outcomes in Kukdong and 
BJ&B cases reflect Islam and McPhail’s discoveries. Workers saw greatest improvements in 
nondiscrimination and safety compliance; and although, workers won better wages and right 
to independent union, companies’ interest in doing business with the two factories declined. 
Ross ends by recounting what appears to be short-lived nature of Kukdong’s and BJ&B’s 
victories.  One of the biggest problems facing factories now is losing the jobs to China 
“where the policy environment for labor organizing is far more hostile than in Mexico or the 
Dominican Republic.”78 Ross’s concluding point is similar to Barrientos’s and further 
reinforces the imbalance of power between companies, suppliers and workers. According to 
Ross, since there are tens of millions of workers globally available to work in supplier plants, 
the buyers are at a clear advantage due to their power to chose which “community of 
workers” to employ. The companies’ freedom to chose suppliers also gives them the freedom 
to choose which work standards to enforce, so when the costs of CSR get too high, 
companies can take their business elsewhere.  
Codes of Conduct 
Gay Seidman studies the overall effectiveness of corporate codes of conduct by 
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looking to the past and examining implementation of the Sullivan Principles. The Principles 
consisted of two corporate codes of conduct, and their enforcement in South Africa helped to 
end the apartheid system. Despite Principles’ seeming success, Seidman doubts their overall 
effectiveness. Although Sullivan Principles had an impact on corporate performance, it is 
unclear if the Principles accomplished much in terms empowering black communities.79 
Seidman states that “corporate officials were much more concerned about fulfilling any 
aspects of social responsibility that would raise their grade, than they were about involving 
their employees’ voices in the process.”80 Additionally, Sullivan’s tentative success came as 
a result of continuous and prolonged social pressure on the corporations to address one broad 
social injustice. Severity of companies’ transgressions was once again an important motivator 
for the consumer participation. Seidman states that “sustained activism came in response to a 
particularly egregious and oppressive form of racial exclusion—a systematic, overarching 
grievance that evoked far more sympathy internationally than the kind of individual, daily 
grievances that pervade factories in the developing world, like forced overtime, delayed 
wages or bathroom breaks denied.”81 Seidman’s conclusion supports the hypothesis that 
emotionality of the issue is far more important in getting consumers motivated to act. Both, 
the apartheid system in South Africa and human trafficking constitute a terrible violation of 
human rights, making it easier for the consumers to rally behind these causes. Similar to the 
Sullivan Principles, current corporate codes of conduct do not do enough address root causes 
of the problem, be it forced labor or other worker abuses. Since SB 657 is another set of rules 
designed to hold companies accountable to standards that do not include systemic reform and 
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preserve current company-supplier power dynamics, it is unlikely that the law will have any 
kind of substantial effect. The importance of eliminating root causes behind labor rights 
violations will be examined in more detail in the next section. 
Root Causes of Labor Abuse 
This section presents research demonstrating that codes of conduct are not adequately 
implemented in the workplace, as well as the reasons for why the code enforcement fails. 
Also discussed here are suppliers’ attitudes towards codes of conduct. Overall, the literature 
indicates that SB 657 will not be enough to overcome systemic inequalities that produce 
forced labor and other worker rights violations.  
 
Codes of Conduct Implementation Challenges 
Whilst Islam and McPhail looked at the causes the led to increased corporate 
adoption of workplace standards, Smith and Barrientos did a study to see if these codes had 
any tangible effect on the workers. Their findings showed that while there were 
improvements in working conditions in some areas, others remained unchanged. The biggest 
shift for the better occurred with regards to health and safety standards that benefited both 
permanent and casual workers. Other improvements included provision of minimum wage, 
better working hours, and employment benefits such as insurance and pension; although, 
contract workers are ineligible for the later category.  With regards to wage, the increases did 
not come about as a result of collective bargaining agreements, and the wages paid still failed 
to constitute a living income.82 The study also failed to find creation of collective bargaining 
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agreements as a result of code implementation. In India, authors have discovered that 
workers were afraid of joining unions because it would cost them their jobs. The workers, 
therefore, abstained from union participation.83 Additionally, trade unions could only 
communicate with the workers outside of factory premises, which is a violation of freedom 
of association.  Workers continued suffering discrimination on the bases of gender, ethnicity, 
and religion. Women and ethnic and religious groups were rarely found in senior supervisory 
and managerial positions.84 Child labor was one area that saw significant improvement. 
However, the authors note that “most suppliers in our study had long been aware of buyer 
non-tolerance of child labour, and were already compliant with legislation on this issue.”85  
Barrientos and Smith also found that in instances where corporations managed their 
supply chains in a more integrated manner, maintained close relations with suppliers and had 
a code implementation strategy in place, the tensions between “doing business” and adhering 
to code standards were handled much better than in complex supply chains where “volumes 
sourced from individual suppliers were often low or channeled through intermediaries and 
agents.”86 The type of management system that the company implements to run its supply 
chain has an impact on the effectiveness of the codes of conduct. However, SB 657 does not 
require companies to provide the kind of disclosure that would make their supply chain 
management strategies clear to consumers. Therefore, it is challenging for consumers to 
fulfill their function as observers and enforcers of fair labor standards. According to 
Foucault’s theory, by lacking more detailed CSR knowledge, consumers also lack power to 
demand more systemic adjustments to the corporate administration of supply chain.    
                                                        
83
 Barrientos and Smith, “Do Workers Benefit from Ethical Trade?” 723. 
84
 Ibid 
85
 Ibid, 720. 
86
 Ibid, 724. 
    
45
Suppliers’ Perspectives 
The reasons behind uneven implementation of labor standards are further explained in 
Islam and Deegan’s study of Bangladesh Garment Manufacturers and Exporters Association 
(BGMEA). Islam and Deegan conducted interviews with BGMEA’s senior executives to 
study the pressure they experience to comply with social and environmental standards.  
Through the interview process, the authors discovered that multinational buyers were the 
main guiding force behind supplier participation in the social disclosure and the type of 
issues being disclosed. Besides corporations (buyers), western consumers, NGOs, labor 
advocacy organizations, and media also play a part in supplier compliance.  One of the 
executives interviewed by Islam stated that “we had to change ourselves following buyers’ 
requirements and to fit with global requirements and restrictions. Western consumers and 
human right organisations pressured foreign buyers, and then foreign buyers pressured us.”87  
Furthermore, the decision to disclose information on social responsibility is driven by 
suppliers’ desire to stay in business and present themselves as appropriate partners for 
transnational companies. Concern for workers’ wellbeing is secondary at best. One 
interviewee states outright, “we immediately take positive steps to ensure adequate safety 
measure for garments workers in order to survive,” implying that staying in business takes 
priority over workers’ human rights.88 Consequently, suppliers will adopt whatever 
workplace standards are of outmost concern to western companies and their customers.89 The 
BGMEA executives believe that before 1990’s industry survival did not depend on supplier 
compliance with social issues such as child labor; however, in the early 90s (around the time 
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news of sweatshops reached the public) elimination of child labor was required to continue 
working with the buyers. The issues of nondiscrimination became important when mental 
and physical abuse of female workers came to light. Similarly, safety became a concern after 
a series of deadly factory fires received attention in the media.90  
Lastly, suppliers are limited in the kinds of changes they can make because they are 
under constant pressure to meet stringent production demands such as downward movement 
in price, shorter lead times between order and delivery, increasing demands of production 
specification, and insecurity of orders.91 Lim and Phillips further explore this point in their 
paper, using Nike as a case study. As a result of massive public outcry against Nike’s 
sweatshop working conditions, the company tried to implement codes of conduct among its 
Korean and Taiwanese suppliers by creating a “collaborative partnership where suppliers had 
a deeper and securer association with the buyer.”92 Nike’s first attempt to implement the code 
failed, since it did not account for Nike’s prioritization of financial gains and economic 
pressures faced by suppliers. On its second attempt, Nike began offering select suppliers “an 
expanded relationship and securer footwear orders, thereby reducing the intense economic 
competition and introducing an incentive to remain CSR compliant.”93 Lim and Phillips 
report that suppliers selected for collaborative partnership showed significant improvement in 
their code of conduct compliance. For example, workers gained benefits such as housing 
subsidies, interest-free loans, and evening education classes. Additionally, the authors found 
that as a result of continued code of conduct implementation, suppliers in their study started 
moving “from ‘conditional morality,’ where they complied with CSR solely to secure orders 
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and labor supplies, to embedding a ‘community morality’ where CSR is considered a good in 
itself.”94 Phillips and Lim show that it is possible for suppliers to better their working 
conditions, if they are provided with adequate tools to meet CSR standards while staying in 
business.  
The attitudes displayed by BGMEA’s managers and, to some extent, by Nike’s 
suppliers explain why Barrientos and Smith’s research found that some workplace standards 
are more effective than others. Improvements in the treatment of female workers, better 
health and safety conditions, and significant reduction in instances of child labor discovered 
by Barrientos and Smith, as well as improvements described by Lim and Phillips, can no 
doubt be attributed to pressure exerted on suppliers by corporations and consumers. The 
studies draw another related conclusion. Islam and Deegan discovered that BGMEA 
executives’ motivation for compliance are driven by need to keep companies doing business 
with them. Lim and Phillips also state that suppliers initially complied with CSR to secure 
orders. At the same time, compliance for the sake of appeasing companies does not go far 
enough in ensuring meaningful improvement in the workplace. Barrientos and Smith 
conclude that the reason for ineffective code implementation in supplier factories are “the 
technocratic approaches that simply verify actions according to pre-set standards, rather than 
engaging in processes of accountability that might help to challenge embedded norms and 
shape change.”95 Barrientos points to the concern with outward easily identifiable CSR issues 
as the reason why successful implementation of codes of conduct has not been fully realized. 
Seidman alluded to it when he wrote that “corporate officials were much more concerned 
about fulfilling any aspects of social responsibility that would raise their grade.” Lim and 
                                                        
94
 Ibid, 152. 
95
 Barrientos and Smith, “Do Workers Benefit from Ethical Trade?” 717. 
    
48
Phillips make similar point, when they show that Nike’s initial attempts to implement codes 
of conduct failed because the company did not account for market pressures (embedded 
norms described by Barrientso) that pushed suppliers to sacrifice meaningful CSR 
compliance in favor of meeting product performance and price standards. The bottom line of 
these findings is that, so far, companies have not engaged with challenging the current 
system because it would not serve their interests. Nike is somewhat of an exception since it 
was forced to go above-and-beyond on its CSR engagement or risk further boycotts and 
deterioration of its image. However, Nike’s CSR reforms were driven by undeniable self-
interest. Regardless of Nike’s experiences, the results remain the same. In the present system, 
suppliers have to meet whatever norms companies set for them, and companies don’t 
challenge suppliers to do better, unless a strong reaction from a consumer base pushes them 
to adopt new standards. Even then, corporations are learning how to manage consumer 
behavior so that whatever negative feedback consumers provide does not significantly 
interfere with corporate operations. From the theoretical standpoint, current norms allow 
corporations to maintain significant degree of power over consumers, suppliers, and workers 
by engaging with CSR just enough to keep consumer support but not enough to undermine 
the structures that keep companies in control. Under these circumstances SB 657 can only 
have a limited effect in the workplace. It asks corporations, and by extension suppliers, to do 
something about forced labor in the supply chains, but it does not provide for a more equal 
distribution of power between suppliers and corporations to engender change. 
Literature Review Conclusions 
Several overarching conclusions can be drawn from the literature review. First, 
enough consumers are willing to buy ethically and participate in boycotts to raise corporate 
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concern. Second, companies try to control consumer behavior by engaging in brand 
impression management and by manipulating the meaning of responsible purchasing and 
conscientious consumption. Third, consumers are more likely to respond to emotionally 
charged issues, such as human trafficking, then to more mundane concerns, such as excessive 
overtime and interference with the unions. Fourth, the pressure from consumers can be 
enough to alter corporate approach to certain CSR aspects. Fifth, companies are unwilling to 
make systemic changes that would compromise their positions of power, and while suppliers 
dislike the need to comply with CSR standards they will adapt as needed to stay in business. 
This can mean several things for SB 657. Since human trafficking is an emotional issue 
consumers are likely to respond favorably to the law and might even use SB 657 disclosures 
to guide their purchasing decisions. However, SB 657 presents no real threat to corporate 
power and might help companies with brand impression management. Therefore, while SB 
657 stands a high chance of being enforced by consumers, it is unclear how much it can 
achieve better working conditions in supply chains. Viewed from theoretical perspective, SB 
657 does not do enough to shift the balance of power from companies to consumers; 
although, such shift would help the Act to accomplish its objective of empowering 
consumers and assisting workers. As long as SB 657 language keeps skirting around the 
transparency demands placed on companies, they will have most of the control over CSR 
discourse. Without full transparency, consumer knowledge of corporations’ activities is 
limited, and consumer actions are restrained from reaching their full impact.  
Methodology 
The methodology will use the framework developed by Free2Work to grade 
companies based on their supply chain management, and juxtapose it with SB 657’s five 
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disclosure requirements in order to gather empirical data on whether the law is an effective 
transparency and worker right protection mechanism. The study will use 22 apparel and 10 
electronics companies that have been previously graded by Free2Work. The companies will 
be evaluated on their management of manufacturing, inputs and raw materials suppliers. 
Free2Work selects companies based on various criteria, including consumer feedback 
received by the organization and a corporation’s standing as a leader within its industry. For 
instance, Free2Work’s apparel report includes data on popular companies such as American 
Eagle, Forever 21, Walmart, Adidas and Gap (complete list of companies evaluated in this 
study can be found in the appendix). Similarly, Free2Work’s research on electronics 
companies, which is not yet publically available, grades popular brands such as Dell and HP. 
Free2Work also evaluates less known companies that try to implement best supply chain 
practices, usually through obtaining Fairtrade USA certification. This data is not included 
here since majority of smaller businesses does not meet necessary criteria to fall under SB 
657’s scope.  
Free2Work evaluates companies’ management of different phases of the supply chain 
that goes beyond the manufacturing stage. While a product might pass through different 
phases of production, Free2Work identifies “one main raw material, one main input, and the 
final manufacturing stage.”96 In case of the apparel industry, Free2Work looks at the cotton 
farming (raw), fabric-making (inputs), and cut-make-trim (manufacturing/final) stages of 
clothing production. In the electronics sector, Free2Work focuses on the mineral mining 
(raw), smelting (inputs), and assembly (manufacturing/final) stages of production. Lastly, in 
                                                        
96
 Haley Wrinkle, "Apparel Industry Trends: From Factory to Factory.” Free2Work, 
November, 2012.  
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instances where a company addresses problems in other production phases (such as leather 
processing in the apparel industry), Free2Work “[caters its] assessment to best evaluate the 
company’s initiatives.”97 
The overall aim of this research is to see how Foucault’s theory on power applies in 
practice.  One of the ways corporations maintain their control over consumers is by 
embracing their concerns for workplace conditions and creating corporate social 
responsibility discourse that claims to address the said concerns. Companies try to stay in 
power by pacifying negative consumer attitudes that can lead to consumer mobilization and 
boycotts. However, the issues are only being handled insofar as to check them off the list and 
inform consumers that appropriate action is being taken. Companies are reluctant to 
undertake reforms that would require giving up their control over the supply chains. The 
literature review shows that implementing overarching structural changes does not typically 
serve corporate interest. Since the image of being in compliance with CSR standards is 
important to companies’ representation of themselves as ethical corporate citizens and to 
companies’ subsequent hold on power, I expect this study to show that majority of 
companies are in compliance with SB 657 disclosure requirements. However, I expect to see 
less disclosure to the questions borrowed from Free2Work evaluation criteria because these 
questions pertain to systemic issues in supply chains and would require a deeper level of 
CSR engagement from the companies. I also expect to find more CSR disclosures in the 
areas that have undergone greater amount of public scrutiny. Since Islam and Barrientos have 
already studied the correlation between adoption and implementation of codes of conduct and 
public pressure, I will instead compare industries (apparel and electronics) and stages of 
                                                        
97 Ibid. 
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production (final/manufacturing, inputs and raw). I expect to find higher rate of disclosures 
in the apparel sector than the electronics sector because apparel has been criticized for its 
poor labor standards for a longer period of time. I also anticipate higher disclosure rate on 
CSR enforcement at the manufacturing stage of production than at inputs and raw material 
stages because manufacturing has received the greatest amount of public attention. The 
section below gives more details about Free2Work evaluation procedures, which will be used 
to gather data about companies’ CSR practices and SB 657 disclosures.  
Free2Work 
Free2Work is a joint project between Not For Sale Campaign and International Labor 
Rights Forum. While Not For Sale focuses on working with survivors of human trafficking 
(predominantly in a commercial sexual exploitation sector), Free2Work works with issues of 
forced and child labor. Free2Work’s stated goal is to provide “consumers with information 
on how products relate to modern-day slavery.”98 This mission is accomplished through a 
consumer tool available on the Free2Work website and as an iPhone and Android app that 
provides grade ratings for popular brands based on corporations’ management of their supply 
chains. Although Free2Work markets itself as anti-human trafficking mechanism, which it 
certainly is, Free2Work’s scope goes beyond human trafficking and encompasses broader 
labor injustices suffered by the workers. In the Free2Work scorecard, only eight out of fifty-
seven questions directly address human trafficking.  
Free2Work measures corporate performance based on four main criteria: companies’ 
policies, traceability and transparency, monitoring and training, and worker rights. More 
information about each of these categories can be found in the next section. Majority of the 
                                                        
98 “Why Free2Work?” www.free2work.org 
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questions are designed to have yes/no answers, with “partial” also being a possible answer 
choice. The rest of the questions require a numerical input either with percentages or whole 
numbers; other possible answer choices to these questions include “unknown or non-public,” 
“some portion,” or “significant portion.” Free2Work uses information publically available on 
companies’ websites, and in some cases, websites of other organizations such as Fair Labor 
Association to fill out a preliminary scorecard. Afterwards, the scorecards are send to the 
companies for review and to provide missing information. If a company does not respond, 
Free2Work gives it zero credit for the missing information and uses available materials to 
finalize the scorecard and release it to the public.  
Free2Work Evaluation Criteria 
Policies 
The first section of Free2Work tool evaluates corporations’ supplier policies, which 
are typically found in supplier codes of conduct. Free2Work questions in the Policies section 
are reflective of international worker rights principles outlined in the Social Accountability 
International SA8000 Standard, the ILO and various UN conventions dealing with labor. 
These standards address, among other things, topics of child and forced labor, working hours, 
the right to freedom of association and collective bargaining, and protection from 
discrimination. Along with incorporating international labor standards, Free2Work tool asks 
questions that help to determine how thoroughly the codes of conduct are enforced. For 
example, Free2Work wants to know if the codes are applied to multiple levels of supply 
chain, including the raw materials stage of production, and if the workplace standards are 
included in supplier contracts, making supplier compliance with the code mandatory instead 
of optional. Aware that contract laborers are some of the most vulnerable individuals in the 
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workplace, Free2Work inquires into companies’ subcontracting policies. More specifically, 
Free2Work wants to know if a company has a policy that “addresses subcontracting in the 
supply chain (including homework where applicable),” stipulating that “policy must include 
either a plan to prevent subcontracting or else a plan to ensure Code standards are met in 
subcontracting arrangements.” Free2Work also asks if suppliers are prohibited from using 
recruitment fees, which can put workers into debt bondage. Additionally, Free2Work checks 
if a company is a part of any multi-stakeholder initiatives and whether or not a company has 
made any effort to use responsible purchasing practices, meaning that a company is 
“managing sampling, order timelines or prices to enable factories to provide decent working 
conditions.” 
Traceability and Transparency 
Traceability and Transparency category evaluates how companies manage their 
supply chains at manufacturing, inputs (when applicable), and raw material stages. The 
purpose of this category is to assess how much information the company has about its 
suppliers, since oftentimes companies do not know who some of the suppliers are, precluding 
monitoring of working conditions. Companies are expected to answer how many suppliers 
produce for them and if they have traced or are in a process of tracing locations of unknown 
suppliers. To follow up, Free2Work asks if a company posts a public list of supplier 
addresses and locations. By doing so, a company can demonstrate its commitment to greater 
transparency and better CSR, since watchdog groups can use supplier names and locations to 
investigate them and to produce independent reports on working conditions for consumers to 
view. Free2Work also pays special attention to the countries where suppliers are located 
since certain places are more likely to be in violation of labor standards than others. For 
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instance, Uzbekistan is notorious for the use of child labor in cotton farming. Therefore, if a 
company is sourcing its cotton from Uzbekistan, it will be graded on a high-risk scale, unless 
it can prove that the cotton is free of child labor. On the other hand, if company’s suppliers 
are located in place with a strong rule of law and enforced worker rights, the company will be 
rated on a low-risk scale. If the company does not disclose countries where its suppliers 
operate, the company is automatically placed in the high-risk category. Additionally, 
Free2Work checks if companies’ monitoring of labor brokers extends beyond measures at the 
policy level. Free2Work asks if a company is tracking suppliers’ use of temporary contract 
workers and if a company requires direct suppliers to keep record on every subcontractor and 
subcontract. 
Monitoring and Training 
As with Traceability and Transparency, questions in this category apply to various 
levels of supply chains, organized by Free2Work into manufacturing, inputs, and raw 
materials phases. Within the Monitoring and Training category, Free2Work checks what 
measures companies have taken to ensure that suppliers are compliant with the codes of 
conduct. Free2Work asks what percent of suppliers is monitored internally per year by the 
company and by third-party monitors with labor standards accreditation. Moreover, 
Free2Work wants to know if suppliers are monitored with unannounced visits and off-site 
worker interviews, if suppliers are checked for the use of labor brokers, and if the broad 
monitoring results are shared publically. For the training portion of evaluation, companies are 
checked on whether “auditors and factory managers [are] trained to identify human 
trafficking, child labor, and forced labor,” and whether a company invests in supplier 
compliance through training and financial support. 
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Worker Rights 
The final evaluation category is Worker Rights. Here, questions asked by Free2Work 
are meant to determine if companies’ policies have tangible effect on the lives of workers. 
The issue of living wage is brought up, as well as inquiries into whether a company adjusts 
its behavior to be more considerate of worker rights. For example, Free2Work wants to know 
if a company has a policy of making sourcing decisions based on supplier labor conditions, 
and if a company has a way of ensuring that the workers are fully paid for the hours worked 
in cases where company decides to end its relationship with the supplier. Free2Work checks 
if suppliers have co-operatives or unions that are worker-owned and democratically 
organized. Free2Work specifically asks “how many suppliers are known to have collective 
bargaining agreements in place?” Free2Work also wants to know if a company has grievance 
system and dispute resolution mechanisms in place, if workers can submit anonymous 
complaints, if a third party can report grievances on workers’ behalf, and if the resolutions 
are publically disclosed. The last question is a transparency and awareness measure for the 
workers and the general public, since it gives a clear view of how a company addresses 
infringements on worker rights. Lastly, Free2Work asks a series of questions to determine 
what mechanisms companies have in place to remediate child and forced labor. The 
questions are as follows: Does the [company] have local partnerships in place in high-risk 
areas to rehabilitate child or forced laborers when found?; When child or forced labor is 
removed from the workplace, is it later verified by unannounced monitoring?; If child labor 
is discovered, does the [company] find a way to provide for the child's education and replace 
the lost income to the family?; If forced labor is discovered, does the [company] facilitate the 
individual's reintegration into the labor market and transition to decent work?; Where 
    
57
appropriate will the [company] cooperate with local authorities, government, law 
enforcement, victim service providers and others to ensure full protection of trafficking, 
forced and/or child laborer(s)?  
Free2Work and SB 657 
Like Free2Work, SB 657 is an evaluation tool designed to measure companies’ CSR 
performance. Both mechanisms are meant to raise consumer awareness of human trafficking 
in the supply chains and the actions companies have taken to stop the practice. However, 
while Free2Work is primarily marketed as an anti-human trafficking tool, it evaluates 
companies based on a broad set of criteria that covers labor violations other than forced and 
child labor, thus holding companies accountable to the wider range of labor standards. 
Furthermore, Free2Work asks questions that shed light on structural problems within the 
buyer-supplier relations, which are one of the root causes of labor rights violations. By 
asking more detailed and exact questions, Free2Work guides consumer attention past the 
obvious problems and toward systemic inequalities embedded in the production process. 
SB 657 Evaluation Tool 
Free2Work has developed a tool to ascertain how well the companies are complying 
with SB 657 requirements; the data on SB 657 evaluations is not publically available. The SB 
657 evaluation tool breaks the law’s requirements into five categories: verification, auditing, 
certification, internal accountability, and training. Within each category, Free2Work asks 
questions to see if a company is compliant with SB 657 and if a company is engaging in best 
practices that, while not being mandated by the law, create stronger accountability in supply 
chains. Below are the definitions for each category and the subsequent questions. Most of the 
questions are answered with “yes,” “no,” or “partial;” the rest can be answered with “no 
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disclosure,” “significant portion,”  “some portion,” or “N/A.” The information used to 
complete the evaluation form is taken from companies’ SB657 disclosures and corporate 
websites.  
Verification 
Free2Work defines Verification as “the extent of which the company has engaged 
product supply chains to work with internal mechanisms and a third party to identify the 
overall risks of human trafficking and slavery, including tracing the supply chain, and 
identifying countries in which the company has sourced from.” Free2Work states that in 
order to effectively manage risks in the supply chain, a company should determine high-risk 
regions of operation and focus on the types of risk present within each region. The 
knowledge of suppliers’ locations becomes imperative in this task. In the verification 
category for mandatory SB657 disclosure, Free2Work asks the following questions: 
Q1. Does the company disclose information on the verification of product supply chains? 
Q2. Does the company disclose information on the use of a third party to verify product 
supply chains? 
In the verification category for best practice disclosure, Free2Work asks:  
Q3. Does the company conduct a tracing project to identify locations of unknown 
producers? 
Q4. Does the company publish a public list of suppliers, including names and addresses? 
Q5. Does the company publish a public list of countries in which suppliers are located? 
Q6. Dos the company state how many suppliers the brand has traced? (“Traced” is 
defined as knowing of suppliers name and locations) 
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Auditing 
Free2Work defines auditing as practices “compliant with a set of standards that address 
human trafficking and slavery that are deployed by the company internally and by a third 
party.” Free2Work emphasizes that while SB 657 concentrates on the final stage 
(manufacturing) production, comprehensive auditing is needed at all levels of the supply 
chain, including input and raw materials stages of production. Free2Work also calls for 
monitoring of labor brokers and recruitment agencies and public disclosure of audit finds. In 
the auditing category for mandatory SB 657 disclosure, Free2Work asks the following 
questions: 
Q7. Does the company disclose information on monitoring? 
Q8. Does the company disclose information on an independent, third party that conducts 
unannounced monitoring of product supply chains? 
In the auditing category for best practice disclosure, Free2Work asks:  
Q9. Does the company disclose statistics on the number of suppliers that are monitored 
annually? 
Q10. Does the company disclose statistics on the number of unannounced visits or off-site 
worker interviews conducted annually? 
Q11. Does the company disclose information on the use of labor brokers? 
Q12. Does the company share broad monitoring results publically? 
Certification 
Certification is taken to mean that company’s direct suppliers must be compliant with 
human trafficking laws throughout the supply chain. Additionally, human trafficking laws 
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have to be extended to apply to contract workers. In the certification category for mandatory 
SB 657 disclosure, Free2Work asks the following question: 
Q13. Does the company disclose whether materials incorporated into company products are 
certified (in compliance with country laws in which they are doing business) by direct 
suppliers? 
In the certification category for best practice disclosure, Free2Work asks:  
Q14. Does the company disclose information about its relationship or its direct suppliers' 
relationships with inputs or raw materials suppliers? 
Q15. Does the company use a third party certification system that certifies suppliers down 
to the raw materials level? 
Internal Accountability 
Free2Work separates Internal Accountability practices into two parts. The first part looks 
at whether the company has “internal mechanisms of action in place to hold persons in non-
compliance accountable with standards on human-trafficking and slavery, including dispute 
resolution mechanisms, preferred supplier programs, exit strategies, and corrective action 
plans.” The second part checks if the company has policies in place to address human 
trafficking. In the internal accountability category for mandatory SB 657 disclosure, 
Free2Work asks the following question: 
Q16. Does the company disclose information on internal accountability standards and 
procedures? 
In the internal accountability category for best practice disclosure, Free2Work asks:  
Q17. Does the company have a Code of Conduct that addresses labor standards? 
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Q18. Does the company include standards (Ex. Vendor Code of Conduct) in supplier 
contracts? 
Q19. Does the company have a preferred supplier program (to promote suppliers that 
demonstrate better and improved labor conditions)?  
Q20. Does the company have a functioning grievance mechanism (must do more than hear 
complaints; must include investigation and efforts to address grievance)? 
Q21. Does the company post results of corrective action plans? 
Q22. When child labor is discovered, does the company find a way to provide for the 
child's education and replace the lost income to the family? 
Q23. When forced labor is discovered, does the company facilitate the individual's 
reintegration into the labor market and transition to decent work? 
Training 
Free2Work defines training criteria as requiring employees and managers in direct 
responsibility in the supply chain to receive training on identifying human trafficking and 
mitigating human trafficking risks. In the training category for mandatory SB 657 disclosure, 
Free2Work asks the following question: 
Q24. Does the company disclose information on whether employees and management are 
trained on human trafficking and risk mitigation in supply chains? 
In the internal accountability category for best practice disclosure, Free2Work asks:  
Q25. Are both auditors and factory managers trained to identify human trafficking, child 
labor and forced labor?  
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Additional Free2Work Questions 
Free2Work questions listed below are not included in the SB 657 evaluation tool. 
However, they disclose important information about corporate codes of conduct and 
companies’ engagement with their supply chains. Therefore, the following questions are also 
a part of this study: 
Q26. Does Supplier Code of Conduct include freedom of association? 
Q27. Does Supplier Code of Conduct include rights to collective bargaining? 
Q28. Does Supplier Code of Conduct prohibit discrimination on the basis of personal 
attributes, tenants or affiliations? 
Q29. Are suppliers prohibited from using recruitment fees? 
Q30. Does the Code of Conduct prohibit the use of regular and excessive overtime? 
Q31. Has the company taken steps to use responsible purchasing practices? 
Q32. Does the company have a policy that addresses subcontracting in the supply chain? 
Q33. Do workers make a living wage? 
Q34. Is a stable price guaranteed to suppliers regardless of world price fluctuation? 
Findings 
This research studied SB 657 disclosures of apparel and electronics companies and 
Free2Work grades of the same companies to see how SB 657 requirements compare to 
comprehensive evaluations conducted by Free2Work. Looking at the results gathered from 
the two evaluation tools side-by-side allows me to examine specific weaknesses in SB 657. 
The overall results are concurrent with Islam’s and Barreintos’ findings summarized in the 
literature review: supply chain management policies that receive majority of the corporate 
response address labor issues that have been a subject of public scrutiny. Overall, attempts at 
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workplace regulations undertaken by companies in this study do not do enough to fix core 
problems behind labor rights violations. These findings are also consistent with theoretical 
supposition that companies will pay special attention to issues that are of concern to the 
public. Engaging with these issues is part of companies’ strategy to shape consumers’ 
perception and action in order to maintain corporate control over consumers’ buying 
decision. Furthermore, the results of this study show that while majority of the companies are 
compliant with all of SB 657 requirements, the legislation, in its current form, is not 
demanding enough to provide comprehensive disclosure on human trafficking in supply 
chains. Consequentially consumers’ potential to enact changes that would benefit the workers 
is suppressed by SB 657’s limitations.  
Verification: Law Requirement 
The first SB 657 requirement states that a company must disclose information on its 
engagement “in verification of product supply chains to evaluate and address risks of human 
trafficking and slavery. The disclosure shall specify if the verification was not conducted by 
a third party.” Among 32 companies evaluated in this study, 94 percent have published 
information addressing their efforts to verify risks in the supply chains, and 53 percent 
specified whether the verification was conducted with the help of the third party. Apparel 
sector had higher disclosure rates than electronics sector, with a 100 percent of apparel 
companies disclosing information on verification, compared to electronics’ 80 percent. On 
the question of third party involvement, 68 percent of apparel companies provided 
information, versus 20 percent of electronics companies.   
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Verification: Best Practice 
  Disclosure rate drops significantly in the verification best practice section. Since the 
law does not mandate that the information sought by best practice questions is stated in SB 
657 disclosures, I relied on information obtained by Free2Work from companies’ CSR 
websites to fill in the blanks. The highest percentage of positive responses was given to 
question six, asking how many of its suppliers a company has traced. Seventy-three percent 
of apparel companies and fifty percent of electronics companies have some knowledge of 
who the suppliers are and where they are located. It should be noted, that to receive a credit 
to this question the company does not have to know all of its suppliers, but only to indicate 
that such knowledge exists, however incomplete. The question with the least disclosure 
inquired if a company had a public list of suppliers, including names and addresses. In the 
apparel sector, 27 percent of companies have a list containing at least a portion of the 
information, and 30 percent of electronics companies make some of the information 
available. However, only four out of thirty-two companies, all in the apparel category, 
receive a full credit for the question, meaning all of the known supplier names and addresses 
are publically disclosed.  
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Table 1.1: VERIFICATION 
 VERIFICATION LAW 
REQUIREMENT VERIFICATION BEST PRACTICE 
 Q1: Does 
the company 
disclose 
information 
on the 
verification 
of product 
supply 
chains? 
Q2: Does the 
company 
disclose 
information 
on the use of 
a third party 
to verify 
product 
supply 
chains? 
Q3: Does the 
company 
conduct a 
tracing 
project to 
identify 
locations of 
unknown 
producers? 
Q4: Does 
the company 
publish a 
public list of 
suppliers, 
including 
names and 
addresses? 
Q5: Does 
the company 
publish a 
public list of 
countries in 
which 
suppliers are 
located? 
Q6: Dose 
the company 
state how 
many 
suppliers the 
brand has 
traced? 
YES 30 17 11 4 12 21 
NO 2 15 18 23 12 11 
PARTIAL 0 0 1 5 8 0 
PERCENT 
DISCLOSED 94% 53% 40%* 28% 63% 66% 
*Timberland and Walmart are marked as N/A for this question; therefore, they are not counted here. In 
Timberland’s case, manufacturing and inputs suppliers have been traced. 
 
Table 1.2: APPAREL AND ELECTRONICS COMPARISON 
VERIFICATION 
 APPAREL ELECTRONICS 
LAW 
REQUIREME
NT 
YES NO PARTIAL 
PERCENT 
DISCLOSE
D 
YES NO PARTIAL 
PERCENT 
DISCLOS
ED 
Q1 22 0 0 100% 8 2 0 80% 
Q2 15 7 0 68% 2 8 0 20% 
BEST 
PRACTICE 
        
Q3 7* 13* 0 35% 4 5 1 50% 
Q4 4 16 2 27% 0 7 3 30% 
Q5 12 5 5 77% 0 7 3 30% 
Q6 16 6 0 73% 5 5 0 50% 
*Timberland and Walmart are marked as N/A for this question; therefore, they are not counted here. In 
Timberland’s case, manufacturing and inputs suppliers have been traced. 
 
Auditing: Law Requirement 
The second SB 657 requirement states that a company must conduct “audits of 
suppliers to evaluate supplier compliance with company standards for trafficking and slavery 
in supply chains. The disclosure shall specify if the verification was not an “independent, 
unannounced audit.” All of the companies evaluated in this study reported conducting audits 
that checked for human trafficking in supply chains. Companies varied in how much 
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information they disclosed about independent party verification; however, majority was still 
in compliance with the law’s demands. Twenty-two companies reported using a mix of 
internal and third party audits, and six other companies said to only be using internal 
auditors. Out of these, only five stated the names of the independent monitoring 
organizations. Twenty-two companies reported whether they conducted announced or 
unannounced audits. Another three companies did not disclose any information. As with 
verification category, apparel sector had greater degree of disclosure, with 91 percent of 
companies being fully or partially compliant with SB 657 requirements, compared to 
electronics’ 80 percent compliance rate.  
 
Auditing: Best Practice 
Fewer companies presented information in the best practice section. The question 
with highest affirmative response asked if the company disclosed statistics on the number of 
suppliers monitored annually. Once again, the company did not have to provide monitoring 
statistics on all of its suppliers to receive credit. The research found that 73 percent of apparel 
companies and 40 percent of electronics companies disclosed monitoring information on 
some of their suppliers. However, not a single company could claim to have been monitoring 
all of its suppliers. The question that received the least amount of positive responses 
pertained to companies’ disclosure on the use of labor brokers. Only 36 percent of apparel 
companies and none of the electronics companies provided some kind of information on the 
contractors in their supply chains. Additionally, less than half of the evaluated companies 
made their broad monitoring results available to the public, and only the apparel sector 
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companies provided statistics on the number of unannounced visits or off-site worker 
interviews conducted annually. 
 
 
 
Table 2.2: APPAREL AND ELECTRONICS COMPARISON 
AUDITING 
 APPAREL ELECTRONICS 
LAW 
REQUIREME
NT 
YES NO PARTIAL 
PERCENT 
DISCLOSE
D 
YES NO PARTIAL 
PERCENT 
DISCLOS
ED 
Q7 22 0 0 100% 10 0 0 100% 
Q8 19 2 1 91% 3 2 5 80% 
BEST 
PRACTICE 
        
Q9 16 6 0 73% 4 6 0 40% 
Q10 12 9 1 59% 0 10 0 0% 
Q11 8 14 0 36% 0 10 0 0% 
Q12 7 13 2 41% 3 6 1 40% 
 
 
 
Table 2.1: AUDITING 
 AUDITING LAW 
REQUIREMENT AUDITING BEST PRACTICE 
 Q7: Does 
the company 
disclose 
information 
on 
monitoring? 
Q8: Does 
the company 
disclose 
information 
on an 
independent, 
third party 
that 
conducts 
unannounce
d monitoring 
of product 
supply 
chains? 
Q9: Does 
the company 
disclose 
statistics on 
the number 
of suppliers 
that are 
monitored 
annually? 
Q10: Does 
the company 
disclose 
statistics on 
the number 
of 
unannounce
d visits or 
off-site 
worker 
interviews 
conducted 
annually? 
Q11: Does 
the company 
disclose 
information 
on the use of 
labor 
brokers? 
Q12: Does 
the company 
share broad 
monitoring 
results 
publically? 
YES 32 22 20 12 8 10 
NO 0 4 12 19 24 19 
PARTIAL 0 6 0 1 0 3 
PERCENT 
DISCLOSED 100% 88% 63% 41% 25% 41% 
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Certification: Law Requirement 
The third SB 657 requirement asks that companies’ direct suppliers certify that 
“materials incorporated into the product comply with the laws regarding slavery and human 
trafficking of the country or countries in which they are doing business.” Out of the 32 
companies evaluated, 26 posted disclosure on certification. Out of these, 21 (95 percent) 
come from the apparel sector, and 5 (50 percent) come from electronics.  
Certification: Best Practice 
In the best practice section, Free2Work asks if a company discloses information about 
its relations or its suppliers’ relations with the inputs or raw materials producers. Thirteen 
apparel companies and four electronics companies made a mention of researching supply 
chains upstream, beyond manufacturing level of production. However, out of all the 
companies, only three have used a third-party certification system to certify suppliers to the 
raw materials level. Timberland and Gildan have relied on Social Accountability 
International and the Fair Labor Association, respectively, to source cotton that is certified as 
free of forced and child labor. In the electronics sector, Motorola received partial credit for 
participating in a workgroup tasked with identifying smelters that could validate through a 
third party that they only source conflict-free minerals.  
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Table 3.2: APPAREL AND ELECTRONICS COMPARISON 
CERTIFICATION 
 APPAREL ELECTRONICS 
LAW 
REQUIREME
NT 
YES NO PARTIAL 
PERCENT 
DISCLOSE
D 
YES NO PARTIAL 
PERCENT 
DISCLOS
ED 
Q13 21 1 0 95% 5 5 0 50% 
BEST 
PRACTICE 
        
Q14 13 9 0 59% 2 6 2 40% 
Q15 2 20 0 9% 0 9 1 10% 
 
 
Internal Accountability: Law Requirement 
SB 657 demands that a company “maintains internal accountability standards and 
procedures for employees or contractors failing to meet company standards regarding slavery 
and trafficking.” All of the companies in this study were compliant with the requirement, 
making a mention of accountability standards in their SB 657 disclosures. Additionally, 
despite not being required by the law, all of the companies reported to having a supplier code 
of conduct that addressed labor standards. 
 
Table 3.1: CERTIFICATION 
 CERTIFICATION 
LAW 
REQUIREMENT 
CERTIFICATION BEST PRACTICE 
 Q13: Does the 
company disclose 
whether materials 
incorporated into 
company products are 
certified by direct 
suppliers? 
Q14: Does the 
company disclose 
information about 
its relationship or its 
direct suppliers' 
relationships with 
inputs or raw 
materials suppliers? 
Q15: Does the 
company use a third 
party certification 
system that certifies 
suppliers down to the 
raw materials level? 
YES 26 15 2 
NO 6 15 29 
PARTIAL 0 2 1 
PERCENT 
DISCLOSED 81% 53% 9% 
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Internal Accountability: Best Practice 
Ten of the companies used their SB 657 disclosures to mention that the code of 
conduct is included in supplier contracts, thus making supplier compliance with the code 
mandatory. Thirteen other companies in this study have similar information available on their 
websites. However, when it came to implementing mechanisms that would facilitate 
successful supplier compliance with the code, many companies have fallen short. Only 38 
percent of evaluated corporations have a preferred supplier program based on supplier 
demonstration of better or improved working conditions. Half of the companies was found to 
have a functioning grievance mechanism available to the suppliers’ workforce. Additionally, 
very few companies post public results of corrective action plans, preventing general public 
from knowing the severity of labor rights violations and methods employed to address them. 
Few companies also take action to rehabilitate victims of child or forced labor found in the 
supply chain. In case of child labor, 10 (all in the apparel sector) out of 32 companies have a 
system to provide for child’s education and replace income lost to the family as a result of 
child’s removal from the workplace. The corporate involvement with the fate of forced labor 
victims is even lower. Five apparel sector companies have stated that they help victims of 
labor trafficking to transition into decent work. 
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Table 4.2: INTERNAL ACCOUNTABILITY APPAREL AND ELECTORNICS 
COMPARISON 
 APPAREL ELECTRONICS 
LAW 
REQUIREME
NT 
YES NO PARTIAL 
PERCENT 
DISCLOSE
D 
YES NO PARTIAL 
PERCENT 
DISCLOS
ED 
Q16 22 0 0 100% 9 0 1 100% 
BEST 
PRACTICE         
Q17 22 0 0 100% 10 0 0 100% 
Q18 18 4 0 82% 5 5 0 50% 
Q19 10 11 1 50% 1 9 0 10% 
Q20 10 8 4 64% 2 8 0 20% 
Q21 8 14 0 36% 0 10 0 0% 
Q22 10 12 0 45% 0 10 0 0% 
Q23 5 17 0 23% 0 10 0 0% 
 
 
Training: Law Requirement 
The last part of SB 657 demands that a company provides its “employees and 
 
 
 
 
Table 4.1: INTERNAL ACCOUNTABILITY 
 INTERNAL 
ACCOUNTABILIT
Y LAW 
REQUIREMENT 
INTERNAL ACCOUNTABILITY BEST PRACTICE 
 Q16: Does the 
company disclose 
information on 
internal 
accountability 
standards and 
procedures? 
Q17: Does 
the 
company 
have a 
Code of 
Conduct 
that 
addresses 
labor 
standards? 
Q18: 
Does the 
company 
include 
standards 
in supplier 
contracts? 
Q19: Does 
the 
company 
have a 
preferred 
supplier 
program? 
Q20: Does 
the 
company 
have a 
functioning 
grievance 
mechanism
? 
Q21: 
Does the 
company 
post 
results of 
corrective 
action 
plans? 
Q22: When 
child labor 
is 
discovered, 
does the 
company 
find a way 
to provide 
for the 
child's 
education 
and replace 
the lost 
income to 
the family? 
Q23: When 
forced 
labor is 
discovered, 
does the 
company 
facilitate 
the 
individual's 
reintegratio
n into the 
labor 
market and 
transition 
to decent 
work?
YES 31 32 23 11 12 8 10 5 
NO 0 0 9 20 16 24 22 27 
PARTIAL 1 0 0 1 4 0 0 0 
PERCENT 
DISCLOSE
D 
100% 100% 72% 38% 50% 25% 31% 16%
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management, who have direct responsibility for supply chain management, training on 
human trafficking and slavery.”  Eighty-four percent of the companies in this study are in 
compliance with training disclosure, stating that company employees and, in some cases, 
suppliers are educated on the subject of human trafficking. As with all previous categories, 
apparel sector has a higher disclosure rate than electronics.  
Training: Best Practice 
Free2Work criteria for training are stricter than the one defined in SB 657. 
Free2Work specifically checks if both, auditors and factory managers, are trained to identify 
human trafficking in supply chains. Training factory managers and auditors is imperative, 
since the former are in direct control of workplace conditions, and latter are responsible for 
correctly identifying instances of human trafficking. Fewer companies are able to satisfy 
Free2Work standards. Six companies received full credit for this question, and thirteen more 
were given partial credit. The remaining 13 companies do not provide any information 
regarding supplier and auditor training.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 5.2: APPAREL AND ELECTRONICS COMPARISON 
 
TRAINING 
 
Table 5.1: TRAINING 
 
 TRAINING LAW 
REQUIREMENT 
TRAINING BEST 
PRACTICE 
 Q24: Does the company 
disclose information on 
whether employees and 
management are trained on 
human trafficking and risk 
mitigation in supply chains? 
Q25: Are both auditors and 
factory managers trained to 
identify human trafficking, 
child labor, and forced labor? 
YES 27 6 
NO 5 13 
PARTIAL 0 13 
PERCENT DISCLOSED 84% 59% 
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 APPAREL ELECTRONICS 
LAW 
REQUIREME
NT 
YES NO PARTIAL 
PERCENT 
DISCLOSE
D 
YES NO PARTIAL 
PERCENT 
DISCLOS
ED 
Q24 20 2 0 91% 7 3 0 70% 
BEST 
PRACTICE         
Q25 6 8 8 64% 0 5 5 50% 
 
 
Free2Work: Additional Questions 
In this study, I also looked at the information the companies provided to additional 
Free2Work questions that were not included in SB 657 evaluation form, but were important 
to better analyzing companies’ supply chain management systems. The information gathered 
here further confirms findings of various authors presented in the literature review: beyond 
creating policies that address some of the more widespread labor concerns, the companies 
rarely engage in thorough restructuring of the supply chains. Majority of the companies have 
polices that prohibit discrimination, guarantee freedom of association and rights to collective 
bargaining. However, fewer companies outright prohibit excessive overtime, usually settling 
for demanding that the work time does not exceed 60 hours/week. None of the companies in 
this study promise their workers a living wage, although all guarantee a minimum wage, 
which frequently falls short of securing adequate living conditions. Only 38 percent of the 
companies prohibit suppliers from using recruitment fees. Additionally, 10 out of 32 
companies have taken measures to address subcontracting in supply chains, which is area 
most fraught with human trafficking and other labor abuses. Out of these ten, only five 
apparel companies have received full credit for their efforts. Lastly, only three percent of all 
surveyed companies guarantee suppliers a stable price for their products regardless of the 
world price fluctuation, demonstrating that majority of suppliers must operate in volatile 
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economic conditions with little help from their buyers. Under these circumstances, suppliers 
become more likely to cut corners, resulting in the worsening working conditions for the 
labor force.  
 
Table 6.2 APPAREL AND ELECTRONICS COMPARISON 
ADDITIONAL FREE2WORK QUESTIONS 
 APPAREL ELECTRONICS 
 
YES NO PARTIAL 
PERCENT 
DISCLOSE
D 
YES NO PARTIAL 
PERCENT 
DISCLOS
ED 
Q26 20 2 0 91% 9 1 0 90% 
Q27 17 5 0 77% 6 4 0 60% 
Q28 19 3 0 86% 9 1 0 90% 
Q29 7 13 2 41% 2 7 1 30% 
Q30 6 4 12 82% 1 1 8 90% 
Q31 6 12 4 45% 0 10 0 0% 
Q32 5 12 5 45% 0 10 0 0% 
Q33 0 22 0 0% 0 10 0 0% 
Q34 0 21 1 3% 0 10 0 0% 
  
 
 
Supply Chain Production Stages 
 
Table 6.1: ADDITIONAL FREE2WORK QUESTIONS 
 Q26: Does 
Supplier 
Code of 
Conduct 
include 
freedom of 
association
? 
Q27: 
Does 
Code 
include 
rights to 
collective 
bargainin
g? 
Q28: Does 
Code 
prohibit 
discriminati
on on the 
basis of 
personal 
attributes, 
tenants or 
affiliations? 
Q29: Are 
suppliers 
prohibited 
from using 
recruitmen
t fees? 
Q30: Code 
prohibits 
the use of 
regular 
and 
excessive 
overtime? 
Q31: Has 
the 
company 
taken steps 
to use 
responsibl
e 
purchasing 
practices? 
Q32: Does 
the 
company 
have a 
policy that 
addresses 
subcontracti
ng in the 
supply 
chain? 
Q33: Do 
workers 
make a 
living 
wage? 
Q34: Is a 
stable 
price 
guaranteed 
to 
suppliers 
regardless 
of world 
price 
fluctuation
? 
YES 29 23 28 9 7 6 5 0 0 
NO 3 9 4 20 5 22 22 32 31 
PARTIAL 0 0 0 3 20 4 5 0 1 
PERCENT 
DISCLOS
ED 
91% 72% 88% 38% 84% 31% 31% 0% 3% 
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In addition to checking company’s management of its suppliers’ policies, 
transparency, monitoring, and worker rights, Free2Work evaluates company’s management 
of various levels of supply chain. To make the grading process easier, Free2Work divides 
these levels into manufacturing, inputs and raw material stages. For apparel industry, 
manufacturing refers to a stage at which fabrics are turned into clothes; inputs is a stage at 
which textiles are produced; raw materials is a point at which the said materials are extracted. 
In the electronics sector, raw materials stage refers to the mining minerals such as tungsten 
and tin; inputs is processing extracted minerals into metals which will be later used in 
manufacturing stage to make electronics products.  
SB 657 requires companies to disclose their efforts to eradicate human trafficking 
from their direct supply chains without specifying what “direct” means and if it extends 
down to the raw materials level. As is evidenced by companies’ answers to questions 14 and 
15 in the best practices verification section, most companies to do not publically discuss their 
engagement with inputs and raw materials suppliers. I used Free2Work scorecards, which 
evaluate corporate management of raw materials and inputs suppliers to gather additional 
information on companies’ involvement with these stages of production. Questions 3-6, 9-12, 
19-23, and 25 all look at manufacturing, inputs and raw materials phases of product 
development.  
In the manufacturing stage, the overall rate of disclosure, complete and partial, was 
44 percent. For inputs, the rate dropped to 16 percent, and for raw materials stage the rate 
went further down to 8 percent. Manufacturing stage of production has a considerably higher 
rate of disclosure than do the other two stages. This can be attributed to the fact that majority 
of past campaigns targeted working conditions among manufacturers of finished goods, and 
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little attention has been paid to conditions of inputs and raw materials suppliers. Given the 
lack of scrutiny, the low rate of disclosure for these two stages is complementary with the 
theory that higher public exposure leads to higher CSR engagement.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 7: SUPPLY CHAINS PRODUCTION STAGES 
FINAL STAGE 
YES PARTIAL SOME MOST ALL N/A NO PERCENT DISCLOSED 
75 38 48 18 8 6 255 44% 
INPUTS 
YES PARTIAL SOME MOST ALL N/A NO PERCENT DISCLOSED 
21 20 18 4 3 4 378 16% 
RAW MATERIALS 
YES PARTIAL SOME MOST ALL N/A NO PERCENT DISCLOSED 
17 5 7 1 2 1 415 8% 
 
 
Research Limitations 
One problem that came up during this research is the question of how to account for 
the CSR information linked in SB 657 disclosures but not actually presented there. 
Companies that link to additional CSR material are unquestionably providing consumers 
with more transparency than companies that do not. When this is the case, should the linked 
information be counted as part of SB 657 disclosure? I decided that it should not, simply 
because there is no absolute guarantee that an average consumer would take the time to click 
on the links and peruse company’s CSR website to uncover more information. In other 
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words, linking to additional CSR material is not the most consumer-friendly way to educate 
the public. While NGOs, such as Not For Sale’s Free2Work, specializing in corporate 
monitoring have experience with navigating and presenting CSR information for consumer 
use, SB 657 describes itself as a tool for consumers. Therefore, I evaluated SB 657 
disclosures as stand-alone documents intended for consumers. However, additional CSR 
information provided by the companies is not ignored in this research. Instead, it is 
incorporated through the Free2Work scorecards, which cover a wider range of criteria than 
SB 657 disclosure requirements.  
Another challenge was interpreting CSR information provided by companies and 
translating it into objective numerical data. The information gathered from scorecards used in 
this research was evaluated by three different Free2Work researchers, including myself. 
Therefore, it is important to be aware that CSR data was examined by different people whose 
thinking process might be a subject to bias. Whenever CSR statement is too vague to 
interpret with certainty, a researcher has to make a judgment call about how much credit a 
company can receive. However, despite some uncertainties, the data gathered here does 
represent a general trend within corporate CSR engagement. The disparity in transparency on 
different Free2Work and SB 657 questions is too great to be of no consequence in 
determining the level of companies’ supply chain engagement. Therefore, this research can 
be used to examine some of the major weakness in CSR and SB 657 implementation.  
Discussion and Recommendations 
As was suggested by the theoretical framework, the companies in this study comply 
with majority of SB 657 disclosure requirements. However, a significantly smaller amount 
can provide answers to Free2Work questions, which ask for more specific information. In 
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fact, majority of information given in SB 657 disclosures is extremely general and does little 
to explain what companies do to ensure effective supply chain management. As a result, SB 
657 risks misrepresenting companies’ level of commitment to ethical standards. Instead of 
curbing corporate power by requiring transparency necessary for consumers to make 
informed purchasing choices to support companies that best address labor issues, SB 657 
preserves the current imbalance of power so that companies have the final say on how they 
are presented in the public eye.  
One example of this is seen with Forever 21. For the auditing portion of SB 657 
disclosure, Forever 21 responded that “we conduct audits of our suppliers through inspectors 
who are employees of the company and check for compliance with company standards for 
trafficking and slavery. We conduct both announced and unannounced audits.”99 This 
provides little insight into Forever 21’s operations. How many of the total suppliers are 
audited and how often? What exactly are the company’s standards for trafficking? What are 
the consequences for a supplier in violation of these standards? Similarly, in the 
accountability section Forever 21 simply states that “we maintain internal accountability 
standards and procedures for employees and contractors who fail to meet company standards 
in [regard to human trafficking].”100 No detail explaining Forever 21’s accountability 
standards is given. Despite failing to provide concrete information, Forever 21 is in perfect 
compliance with SB 657 because it meets all of the law’s disclosure requirements. However, 
Forever 21 faired poorly when its CSR policies were held to a higher standard. The company 
received a “D-” grade from Free2Work, because it failed to answer majority of Free2Work’s 
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questions.101  Forever 21 is one of numerous examples demonstrating why SB 657 is 
incapable of changing current power distribution between companies and other actors 
connected to them. In a way, SB 657 conceals CSR implementation differences between 
companies. The research in this study shows that majority of the 32 corporations were able to 
meet SB 657’s requirements, making them appear equally ethical to an average consumer.  
In some instances, companies with robust CSR practices did not provide full 
disclosure to the SB 657 requirements. Patagonia’s Free2Work overall score is  “B+,” but 
Patagonia’s SB 657 does not give a comprehensive answer to Question 2, thus appearing to 
be less compliant than Forever 21. Yet, Patagonia thoroughly engages with its suppliers in an 
effort to create a more ethical production process. Patagonia is an FLA participant with an 
accredited compliance program. Patagonia also monitors 100 percent of its manufacturing 
suppliers and 20 percent of its inputs suppliers, and has a policy that prohibits unauthorized 
subcontracting. Patagonia is not perfect; it scores a “C+” on worker rights and does not 
comprehensively engage with raw materials suppliers.102 Nevertheless, it has shown more 
commitment to ethical business practices than Forever 21.  
Furthermore, companies might be taking a variety of steps to improve their CSR 
practices in areas that do not easily lend themselves to SB 657 disclosure format. Free2Work 
highlights several apparel companies that exemplify the best practices needed for tangible 
change. According to Free2Work, Patagonia holds itself to high transparency standards 
worthy of recognition. The company discloses all of its final stage-manufacturing suppliers. 
Patagonia specifically works to make information about supplier conditions easily accessible 
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to the public by visually linking “factory locations to their physical addresses and some 
factory demographics (languages spoken, number of employees, gender mix) for all cut- 
make-trim manufacturing sites and some textile mills Patagonia website visitor can also see 
photos and videos on suppliers that produce primarily for Patagonia.”103 Timberland is 
another company willing to be more transparent about its operations. Like Patagonia, 
Timberland discloses a full list of its final stage production suppliers and their locations, as 
well as a partial list of its other suppliers. Timberland also has a “direct knowledge of, or 
relationship with, 100% of its leather suppliers.”104 Patagonia and Timberland give 
consumers a significant degree of insight into their operations, but this detail of information 
is not provided in SB 657 disclosures. However, the kind of transparency given by Patagonia 
and Timberland is much higher in quality than transparency provided by Forever 21 and 
other companies with low Free2Work scores. By disclosing names and addresses of a 
significant portion of their suppliers, Patagonia and Timberland open doors for verification of 
worker conditions in a way that majority of other companies does not. Transparency is a 
chief mechanism through which consumers can exercise their power over companies, and 
companies that take extra steps toward transparency signal their willingness to engage with 
worker rights protection in a more significant manner. While SB 657 is at its core a 
transparency mechanism, its efficiency could be improved by distinguishing between levels 
of transparency displayed by different companies.  
Some companies also take steps to ensure greater worker empowerment, which helps 
to eliminate conditions resulting in forced and child labor. Currently, SB 657 does not 
incorporate worker empowerment efforts into its framework, which is detrimental to the law. 
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According to Free2Work, “In 2011 a handful of major sportswear brands signed an 
innovative freedom of association protocol with Indonesian trade unions and suppliers.” The 
protocol requires suppliers to support workers’ ability to represent themselves and to 
facilitate their right to collective bargaining. The protocol stands out from other similar types 
of agreements because it is legally binding and was negotiated directly with Indonesian trade 
unions. Furthermore, “the agreement outlines a concrete protocol,” which will make 
corporate “meaningful action more likely.”105 Play Fair reports that New Balance and Puma, 
both evaluated in this study, have made progress in implementing protocol on the factory 
level.106 This example demonstrates a shift in the company-supplier-worker dynamic. 
Although companies are still applying pressure on suppliers, the ultimate outcome is meant 
to empower the workers. Since the protocol is legally binding, it indicates that participating 
companies are serious about surrendering portion of power in order to commit to stricter 
worker protection procedures. The companies highlighted for best practice by Free2Work 
show that a corporation can take an in-depth approach to ethical practices of its own volition. 
While it is impossible to know for sure what motivates companies to put more limits on their 
power by providing high level of transparency or entering legally binding agreements, 
articles examined in the literature review indicate that self-interest plays a role in the 
decision. However, unlike companies that practice more surface-level CSR engagement, such 
as adopting pro-worker policies but not making a necessary effort to implement them, 
Patagonia, Timberland, New Balance and Puma appear more committed to instituting change 
among their suppliers. Like Nike and Levi’s in the past, they might be trying to stay ahead of 
the curve by “pre-empt[ing] nongovernmental organizations and the media from playing 
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‘gotcha.’”107 However, by trying to stay ahead of the curve, these companies also managed to 
rise above the current status quo. Theoretically, the new redistribution of power is a different 
take on self-interest; the companies are still working to benefit themselves by attracting and 
keeping consumers, but this time it is done through meaningful and tangential CSR 
compliance. The main difference between these two approaches to CSR is that actors who in 
the past have been denied access to power now have a chance to reclaim some of it. 
Problematically, SB 657 does not adequately measure varying degrees of transparency 
among companies (hindering informed consumer decisions), nor does it highlight companies 
that are committed to altering their power dynamics with suppliers and workers to be more 
equitable. 
Overall, SB 657 disclosures, alone, make it difficult to judge how far apart companies 
are on the CSR scale. In Patagonia’s case, SB 657 reveals a good deal about company’s 
monitoring practices, its engagement with suppliers, and its training procedures. In contrast 
to Patagonia, Timberland is an example of an ethical company with a generic SB 657 
disclosure. Timberland’s regard for the CSR concerns earned it an “A-” from Free2Work.108 
The reason why Timberland’s disclosure is so weak is because it is owned by the V.F. 
Corporation, so the two companies share SB 657 disclosure. However, Timberland manages 
its own supply chain to the standards much higher than V.F.’s (graded “C+” by Free2Work). 
New Balance also has a brief SB 657 disclosure that is a paragraph long and does not reflect 
New Balance’s fairly high Free2Work score, or its participation in the freedom of association 
protocol with Indonesian unions and suppliers.  
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Most other companies in this study used SB 657 to create a positive image of 
themselves, while disclosing as little information as possible. Walmart (Free2Work grade 
D+) writes that “while auditing had been the primary focus of Walmart’s Ethical Sourcing 
program, it was soon realized that ethical sourcing goes far beyond monitoring and should 
also confront the complexities that are at the root of noncompliance, and drive improvements 
in working conditions globally.”109 110 However, Walmart does not say how many of its 
suppliers are audited, nor does it disclose monitoring results; there is also no indication that 
Walmart’s suppliers have better working conditions than the global average. However, 
Walmart satisfies all but one of SB 657 disclosure requirements. Like Walmart, Abercrombie 
and Fitch (Free2Work grade “D+”) uses SB 657 to show its support for worker rights and its 
opposition to human trafficking.111 Furthermore, the company provides some measure of 
detail about its auditing process: 
The auditors are experts in the local laws of the countries in which we produce, and 
they speak the local languages. Each audit consists of a factory walk-through, 
confidential interviews with workers, and a review of relative documentation (e.g. 
payroll, time records, employee age verification, etc.). We typically audit factories 
once per year, but we can visit more or less depending on the factory's performance 
and track record. To maintain the integrity of the audit, we do not provide the audit 
date to the factories ahead of time. However, to ensure the necessary personnel is 
available and the documentation can be gathered in time, we do offer a two-week 
window during which we will audit the factory.112 
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Nevertheless, in all other areas little is know. Abercrombie and Fitch gives only partial 
information about its supplier locations and does not publically share its monitoring results.  
 For the most part, companies’ SB 657 disclosures fall short of providing information 
that accurately reflects their supply chain management systems. This becomes evident when 
comparing low Free2Work questions response rate to a much higher response rate for SB 657 
disclosures. Part of the reason why SB 657 demands are easier to meet is their lack of 
specificity. SB 657 language does not incorporate the level of detail needed to provide true 
transparency, thus lowering the risks companies would face from having to disclose negative 
information about themselves. Asking a company to report if it “conducts audits of suppliers 
to evaluate supplier compliance with company standards for trafficking and slavery in supply 
chains,” is not the same as asking it about the number of suppliers monitored, the use of 
contract workers, credibility of the auditing firm, etc.  
 Lastly, it is unreasonable to expect that an average consumer would know enough 
about supply chain management to discern how ethical companies’ practices are from 
disclosures alone. Reading that company has a code of conduct, monitors its suppliers for 
compliance, and trains its employees on human trafficking would generally make a positive 
impression on a consumer. The danger with SB 657 is that instead of empowering 
conscientious consumers, it might give them a false sense of security that their favorite 
company is doing everything in its power to eliminate forced labor from the supply chains. 
Foucault’s theory tells us that power can be applied through transparency i.e. making 
a subject completely visible to the observer, would make the subject alter his or her behavior 
to meet observer’s expectations. By bringing more transparency to the supply chains, SB 657 
is supposed to endow consumers with power to discipline and change corporate behavior. 
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This intention is made clear in SB 657, which states that “absent publicly available 
disclosures, consumers are at a disadvantage in being able to distinguish companies on the 
merits of their efforts to supply products free from the taint of slavery and trafficking. 
Consumers are at a disadvantage in being able to force the eradication of slavery and 
trafficking by way of their purchasing decisions.” Unfortunately, SB 657’s disclosure 
demands do more to aid companies than they do to empower consumers. Since SB 657 
leaves a lot of areas in need of transparency unaddressed, the companies are free to use the 
ambiguity to their advantage and usurp consumers’ power by withholding crucial 
information. 
Foucault believed that “we are subjected to the production of truth through power and 
we cannot exercise power except through the production of truth.”113 Various agents in our 
society strive to create truth amiable to them in order to secure more power. Transnational 
companies are no exception. For them, the truth has to match with consumers’ values and 
expectations of a good business. Recently, it became understood that a good business must be 
able to provide a quality product, as well as be able to meet safe and ethical workplace 
standards. However, consumers’ demands for strong CSR practices and easily available and 
affordable products are not always compatible with each other. Companies have to deliver on 
tangible products and on a more ambiguous concept of ethical business standards. In case of 
the former, consumers can easily assess characteristic of a product by examining it in the 
store. For the later companies have to create a narrative to convince consumers that the 
product they might want to purchase does not come with a price tag of sweatshop labor 
conditions and exploited workers. Part of companies’ success depends on how well they can 
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convince consumers that their products are made under fair working conditions. Corporate 
power over consumer relies on consumers’ willingness to believe that their money does not 
go toward supporting harmful practices. When that belief is lost, companies risk serious 
damage to their image and profits. SB 657 allows companies to create “truth” that is 
favorable to them, by showcasing their strongest ethical practices and glossing over flaws 
within their supply chain management systems. Through SB 657, Walmart, Forever 21 and 
Abercrombie and Fitch try to project the image of themselves as ethical corporate citizens 
that does not match up with their business practices. In fact, it’s almost impossible to tell how 
responsible business practices of these organizations are because they do not give enough 
public information to create an accurate portrayal. So while Walmart and Abercrombie and 
Fitch’s SB 657 disclosures fit the law’s requirements, both of these companies are currently 
targets of labor rights violations campaigns.114 Conforming to Foucault’s theory, companies 
are trying to produce their own version of discourse by manipulating the truth to preserve 
control over their public image. By doing so, a company can claim to be ethical and present 
its compliance with SB 657 as evidence to support these assertions. In cases where 
information to contrary might exist, it has to compete against the “truth” a company crafts 
about itself. Consumer then must make a decision what information to believe and how to act 
accordingly. While consumers might mobilize together to regulate corporate behavior, mixed 
messages about companies’ ethics can deter a united effort to hold companies accountable.  
One way to remediate the current imbalance of power is to give consumers accurate 
knowledge of the workplace conditions where products are created. Consumers have shown 
their willingness to act when they know of existing injustices. While unable to exercise the 
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power of a law-binding agreement such as freedom of association protocol signed by Puma 
and New Balance, consumers can penalize companies through boycotts and shaming tactics, 
which help to regulate corporate behavior. Foucault’s theory states that dominant groups 
exercise their power by producing knowledge. Having better transparency in supply chain 
management would help to counteract marketing strategies companies have been using to 
present themselves as ethical businesses, where such marketing might be inaccurate or 
misleading. Free2Work states that “public transparency is important…because it shows a 
company’s willingness to being held externally accountable for its supply chain.” 
115Transparency provides public with knowledge that can be verified against companies’ 
discourse about themselves and demand accountability when needed. This means that SB 
657 requirements must to be more demanding and more specific about which information to 
disclose. SB 657 has to start asking more of Free2Work-type questions that request more 
insight into companies’ efforts to correct structural flaws. One potential question to ask 
would be about companies’ policies on the use of labor brokers (in this study only 25 percent 
of companies disclose this information). Another question can inquire into company’s use of 
responsible purchasing practices (only 28 percent of companies in this study have tried to 
implement these practices). Indeed, all Free2Work questions presented here want a 
significantly higher level of accountability and transparency from companies than SB 657. In 
order to truly fulfill SB 657’s objective, consumers must be given knowledge that targets the 
problem at its core. Therefore, the more detailed and precise the information is, the better 
consumers will be able to “force the eradication of trafficking” through their purchasing 
choices and be successful at it.  
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Along with ending human trafficking, demanding better transparency from the 
companies might have another positive outcome. Free2Work observes that its indicators 
(policies, transparency and traceability, monitoring and training, and worker rights) correlate 
“with a piece of a system that should, if appropriately used, enable improvement in working 
conditions and the elimination of modern slavery. We hold that child and forced labor are far 
less likely in supply chains that are highly visible to companies and where workers have a 
voice to negotiate working conditions and speak out against grievances.”116 In other words, 
eradication of forced and child labor depends on the overall improvement in the workplace 
regulation. It follows that although SB 657 is only concerned with forced and child labor, its 
impact can be extended to effect corporate enforcement of other workplace standards such as 
wages and grievance mechanisms. Making companies transparent about how they address 
systemic issues in supply chains, even only with regard to forced labor, might eventually 
force companies to implement institutional changes. Since labor rights are violated as a result 
of systemic power imbalances between corporations and suppliers, correcting some of these 
imbalances will lead to a more effective compliance with various labor standards. Currently, 
SB 657 is shaping the discourse around corporate accountability on human trafficking. 
However, by excluding other labor concerns from the discussion, SB 657 fails to construct 
the issue of labor rights abuses as a product of a deeply-rooted problem. This formulation is 
flawed because it gives companies significant amount of power when the opposite is 
intended to happen. However, with adjustments to the law’s disclosure demands to ask for` 
better transparency, SB 657 can be a formidable anti-trafficking mechanism that also protects 
the rights of non-trafficked workers.  
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APPENDIX: LIST OF COMPNIES RESEARCHED 
 
APPAREL 
 
Abercrombie and Fitch 
Aeropostale 
American Eagle 
Carter’s 
Eileen Fisher 
Forever 21 
Fruit of the Loom 
Gap Inc.  
Gildan 
Hanes 
Levi’s 
Lululemon 
New Balance 
Patagonia 
Puma 
Phillips-Van Heusen 
Quicksilver 
Russell Athletic 
Skechers 
Timberland 
VF 
Walmart 
 
ELECTORNICS 
 
Acer 
Dell 
Hewlett-Packard 
IBM 
Motorola 
Oracle 
SanDisk 
Garmin 
Lenovo 
TomTom 
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APPENDIX 
Apparel Companies Data 
 
Aeropostale Abercrombie and Finch 
American 
Eagle Carter's Eileen Fisher Forever 21 
Fruit of the 
Loom GAP Gildan Hansebrands Levi's Lululemon 
VERIFICATION LAW REQUIREMENT 
Q1 YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Q2 YES NO YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES NO YES 
VERIFICATION BEST PRACTICE 
Q3 NO YES YES NO YES NO NO YES NO NO YES NO 
Q4 NO NO NO NO PARTIAL NO NO NO YES NO YES NO 
Q5 NO PARTIAL YES NO YES NO PARTIAL PARTIAL YES YES YES YES 
Q6 YES YES YES NO YES NO NO YES YES YES YES NO 
AUDITING LAW REUQIREMENT 
Q7 YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Q8 YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES PARTIAL YES YES YES 
AUDIDTING BEST PRACTICE 
Q9 NO NO YES NO YES NO NO YES YES YES YES YES 
Q10 NO NO YES NO PARTIAL NO YES NO YES YES NO YES 
Q11 NO NO YES NO YES NO NO YES NO YES NO NO 
Q12 NO NO YES NO NO NO NO YES YES NO NO NO 
CERTIFICATION LAW REUQIREMENT 
Q13 YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
CERTIFICATION BEST PRACTICE 
Q14 NO YES YES NO YES NO YES YES YES YES YES NO 
Q15 NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO YES NO NO NO 
INTERNAL ACCOUNTABILITY LAW REQUIREMENT 
Q16 YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
INTERNAL ACCOUNTABILIT BEST PRACTICE 
Q17 YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Q18 NO NO YES YES YES NO YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Q19 NO NO YES NO YES NO NO YES NO YES YES NO 
Q20 NO NO PARTIAL NO PARTIAL NO PARTIAL YES YES YES YES YES 
Q21 NO NO YES NO PARTIAL NO YES NO YES YES NO NO 
Q22 NO YES YES NO YES NO NO YES NO YES YES YES 
Q23 NO NO YES NO YES NO NO NO NO NO NO YES 
TRAINING LAW REQUIREMENT 
Q24 YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
TRAINING BEST PRACTICE 
Q25 NO NO YES NO YES PARTIAL NO YES PARTIAL YES PARTIAL PARTIAL 
ADDITIONAL FREE2WORK QUESTIONS 
Q26 YES YES YES NO YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Q27 NO NO YES NO YES NO YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Q28 YES YES YES NO YES NO YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Q29 NO NO YES NO YES NO NO PARTIAL YES NO YES NO 
Q30 PARTIAL PARTIAL YES NO YES NO YES PARTIAL YES PARTIAL YES PARTIAL 
Q31 NO NO YES NO YES NO NO PARTIAL PARTIAL NO YES NO 
Q32 NO NO PARTIAL NO YES NO NO YES NO PARTIAL YES NO 
Q33 NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
Q34 NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
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Apparel Companies Data Contd. 
 
New Balance Patagonia Puma PVH Quicksilver Russell Skechers Timberland VF Walmart 
VERIFICATION LAW REQUIREMENT 
Q1 YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Q2 NO NO YES YES YES YES YES NO NO NO 
VERIFICATION BEST PRACTICE 
Q3 NO YES YES NO NO NO NO NA NO NA 
Q4 PARTIAL YES NO NO NO NO NO YES NO NO 
Q5 YES YES YES YES NO PARTIAL NO YES YES PARTIAL 
Q6 YES YES YES YES NO YES NO YES YES YES 
AUDITING LAW REUQIREMENT 
Q7 YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Q8 YES YES YES YES YES YES YES NO NO YES 
AUDIDTING BEST PRACTICE 
Q9 YES YES YES YES YES YES NO YES YES YES 
Q10 YES YES YES NO YES YES NO YES NO YES 
Q11 YES YES YES NO NO NO NO YES NO NO 
Q12 NO PARTIAL YES YES NO PARTIAL NO YES NO YES 
CERTIFICATION LAW REUQIREMENT 
Q13 YES YES NO YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
CERTIFICATION BEST PRACTICE 
Q14 NO YES YES YES NO NO NO YES YES NO 
Q15 NO NO NO NO NO NO NO YES NO NO 
INTERNAL ACCOUNTABILITY LAW REQUIREMENT 
Q16 YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
INTERNAL ACCOUNTABILIT BEST PRACTICE 
Q17 YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Q18 YES YES YES YES YES NO YES YES YES YES 
Q19 YES YES YES NO NO PARTIAL NO YES YES NO 
Q20 YES YES YES YES NO YES NO YES NO NO 
Q21 YES YES YES NO NO YES NO NO NO NO 
Q22 YES YES YES NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
Q23 YES YES NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
TRAINING LAW REQUIREMENT 
Q24 YES YES YES YES YES YES YES NO NO YES 
TRAINING BEST PRACTICE 
Q25 PARTIAL PARTIAL PARTIAL NO NO PARTIAL NO YES YES NO 
ADDITIONAL FREE2WORK QUESTIONS 
Q26 YES YES YES YES YES YES NO YES YES YES 
Q27 YES YES YES YES YES YES NO YES YES YES 
Q28 YES YES YES YES YES YES NO YES YES YES 
Q29 YES YES NO NO NO YES NO PARTIAL NO NO 
Q30 PARTIAL PARTIAL PARTIAL PARTIAL PARTIAL YES NO PARTIAL PARTIAL NO 
Q31 YES YES PARTIAL NO NO PARTIAL NO YES NO NO 
Q32 PARTIAL YES PARTIAL NO NO NO NO YES PARTIAL NO 
Q33 NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
Q34 NO NO NO NO NO NO NO PARTIAL NO NO 
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Electronics Companies Data 
 Acer Dell Garmin HP IBM Lenovo Motorola Oracle SanDisk TomTom 
VERIFICATION LAW REQUIREMENT 
Q1 YES YES NO YES YES YES YES NO YES YES 
Q2 NO NO NO YES NO NO YES NO NO NO 
VERIFICATION BEST PRACTICE 
Q3 NO PARTIAL NO YES NO YES YES NO NO NO 
Q4 NO PRATIAL NO PARTIAL PARTIAL NO NO NO NO NO 
Q5 NO NO NO PARTIAL PARTIAL PARTIAL NO NO NO NO 
Q6 NO YES NO YES YES NO YES NO NO YES 
AUDITING LAW REUQIREMENT 
Q7 YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Q8 NO PARTIAL PARTIAL YES YES PARTIAL YES NO PARTIAL PARTIAL 
AUDIDTING BEST PRACTICE 
Q9 YES YES NO YES NO YES NO NO NO NO 
Q10 NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
Q11 NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
Q12 YES NO NO YES PARTIAL NO YES NO NO NO 
CERTIFICATION LAW REUQIREMENT 
Q13 YES YES NO YES NO NO NO YES YES NO 
CERTIFICATION BEST PRACTICE 
Q14 PARTIAL NO NO YES NO YES NO NO NO NO 
Q15 NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
INTERNAL ACCOUNTABILITY LAW REQUIREMENT 
Q16 PARTIAL YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
INTERNAL ACCOUNTABILIT BEST PRACTICE 
Q17 YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Q18 YES NO NO YES NO NO NO NO NO YES 
Q19 NO NO NO YES NO NO NO NO NO NO 
Q20 NO NO NO YES NO NO NO YES NO NO 
Q21 NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
Q22 NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
Q23 NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
TRAINING LAW REQUIREMENT 
Q24 YES YES NO YES NO YES YES YES YES NO 
TRAINING BEST PRACTICE 
Q25 PARTIAL PARTIAL NO PARTIAL NO NO PARTIAL PARTIAL NO NO 
ADDITIONAL FREE2WORK QUESTIONS 
Q26 YES YES NO YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Q27 YES YES NO YES NO NO YES YES NO YES 
Q28 YES YES NO YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Q29 NO NO NO NO YES NO YES PARTIAL NO NO 
Q30 PARTIAL PARTIAL NO PARTIAL PARTIAL YES YES PARTIAL PARTIAL PARTIAL 
Q31 NO NO NO NO NO PARTIAL NO NO NO NO 
Q32 NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
Q33 NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
Q34 NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
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APPENDIX 
 
Stages of Production Data 
 
 
 
 
FINAL STAGE 
 
YES PARTIAL 
SOME 
(1-50% or 
unspecified) 
MOST 
(51-99%) 
ALL 
(100%) N/A NO 
Does the company conduct a tracing project to identify 
locations of unknown producers? 2 0    6 24 
Does the company publish a public list of suppliers, including 
names and addresses? 4 5    0 23 
Does the company publish a public list of countries in which 
suppliers are located? 11 9    0 12 
Dose the company state how many suppliers the brand has 
traced?   12 7 5 0 8 
Does the company disclose statistics on the number of 
suppliers that are monitored annually?   15 10 2 0 5 
Does the company disclose statistics on the number of 
unannounced visits or off-site worker interviews conducted 
annually? 
  13 1 1 0 17 
Does the company disclose information on the use of labor 
brokers? 7 1    0 24 
Does the company share broad monitoring results publically? 10 3    0 19 
Does the company have a preferred supplier program? 9 2    0 21 
Does the company have a functioning grievance mechanism?  11 5    0 16 
Does the company post results of corrective action plans?   8 0 0 0 24 
When child labor is discovered, does the company find a way 
to provide for the child's education and replace the lost 
income to the family? 
10 0    0 22 
When forced labor is discovered, does the company facilitate 
the individual's reintegration into the labor market and 
transition to decent work? 
5 0    0 27 
Are both auditors and factory managers trained to identify 
human trafficking, child labor, and forced labor? 6 13    0 13 
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Stages of Production Data Contd. 
 
INPUTS 
 
YES PARTIAL 
SOME 
(1-50% or 
unspecified) 
MOST 
(51-99%) 
ALL 
(100%) N/A NO 
Does the company conduct a tracing project to identify 
locations of unknown producers? 5 1    4 22 
Does the company publish a public list of suppliers, including 
names and addresses? 0 1    0 31 
Does the company publish a public list of countries in which 
suppliers are located? 1 8    0 23 
Dose the company state how many suppliers the brand has 
traced?   6 2 3 0 21 
Does the company disclose statistics on the number of 
suppliers that are monitored annually?   6 2 0 0 24 
Does the company disclose statistics on the number of 
unannounced visits or off-site worker interviews conducted 
annually? 
  4 0 0 0 28 
Does the company disclose information on the use of labor 
brokers? 1 1    0 30 
Does the company share broad monitoring results publically? 3 0     29 
Does the company have a preferred supplier program? 3 2     27 
Does the company have a functioning grievance mechanism?  4 2     26 
Does the company post results of corrective action plans?   2 0 0 0 30 
When child labor is discovered, does the company find a way 
to provide for the child's education and replace the lost 
income to the family? 
2 1    0 29 
When forced labor is discovered, does the company facilitate 
the individual's reintegration into the labor market and 
transition to decent work? 
1 0    0 31 
Are both auditors and factory managers trained to identify 
human trafficking, child labor, and forced labor? 1 4    0 27 
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Stages of Production Data Contd. 
 
RAW MATERIALS 
 
YES PARTIAL 
SOME 
(1-50% or 
unspecified) 
MOST 
(51-99%) 
ALL 
(100%) N/A NO 
Does the company conduct a tracing project to identify 
locations of unknown producers? 7 1    1 23 
Does the company publish a public list of suppliers, including 
names and addresses? 1 0    0 31 
Does the company publish a public list of countries in which 
suppliers are located? 0 3    0 29 
Dose the company state how many suppliers the brand has 
traced?   5 1 1 0 25 
Does the company disclose statistics on the number of 
suppliers that are monitored annually?   1 0 1 0 30 
Does the company disclose statistics on the number of 
unannounced visits or off-site worker interviews conducted 
annually? 
  1 0 0 0 31 
Does the company disclose information on the use of labor 
brokers? 1 0    0 31 
Does the company share broad monitoring results publically? 1 0    0 31 
Does the company have a preferred supplier program? 2 0    0 30 
Does the company have a functioning grievance mechanism?  2 0    0 30 
Does the company post results of corrective action plans?   0 0 0 0 32 
When child labor is discovered, does the company find a way 
to provide for the child's education and replace the lost 
income to the family? 
1 0    0 31 
When forced labor is discovered, does the company facilitate 
the individual's reintegration into the labor market and 
transition to decent work? 
1 0    0 31 
Are both auditors and factory managers trained to identify 
human trafficking, child labor, and forced labor? 1 1    0 30 
 
 
 
 
